9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
724.
Lt Gen Rollo
also reported that Mr Kevin Rudd, newly elected Prime Minister
of
Australia,
had visited Basra and announced the withdrawal of the Australian
battlegroup
and
training contingent from Dhi Qar and Muthanna in June 2008, leaving
only
embedded
staff.
725.
On 31
December, Lt Gen Rollo sent ACM Stirrup a paper considering the
main
areas of
coalition effort for 2008, and issues for the UK to
address.344
726.
In his
introduction, Lt Gen Rollo wrote that Iraq was “in a much better
condition
than it was
a year ago”. The “viciously destabilising sectarian conflict” was
now largely
absent;
AQ-I had been driven out of most of Anbar and Baghdad and was
gradually
being
driven into the North; the Sadrists were maintaining their freeze
and were riven
with
internal conflict; and the ISF were rapidly increasing in number
and capability.
But
significant sections of the country remained insecure and violence
remained at an
unacceptably
high level, meaning that “we do not yet have ‘irreversible
momentum’”.
727.
Given the
dynamic nature of the campaign, Lt Gen Rollo reported
that
Gen Petraeus
would not make recommendations beyond the end of 2008
when
he reported
to Congress in March. The main themes of the coalition effort for
2008
would
be:
•
The pursuit
of AQ-I, which was already badly damaged, and now able to
operate
effectively
only in areas where there are inadequate security forces and
where
the
population felt threatened, for example by local
militias.
•
The
“reshaping of JAM/OMS”. The movement was splitting, its future
direction
unclear;
the coalition and the Iraqi Government would continue to support
the
freeze, and
would not go after any JAM members who respected it, but
would
pursue
others (including the Special Groups) who continue to conduct
criminal
actions,
seeking to separate the reconcilables from the irreconcilables and
bind
them into
the political process.
•
Working
with neighbouring countries to reduce the flow of foreign
fighters
into Iraq.
•
Opening up
the economy and increasing employment. The immediate
concern
for the MNF
was the need to help the tens of thousands of Sunni Arabs
who
had
participated in the Anbar Awakening to find jobs, reducing their
“economic
motivation
to take up arms against the Iraqi Government or MNF”.
•
Building
governance capacity at all levels.
•
Developing
future bilateral security relationships, to form the basis for
coalition
engagement
in Iraq when resolution 1790 expired in December 2008.
344
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 31 December 2007, ‘Iraq in 2008 – An Opportunity To
Be Taken’.
315