The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
spelling
out red lines in relation to Iraqi moves against Kuwait or the
Kurds;
•
setting out
a “Contract for the Iraqi People (cf the FRY/Milosevic), offering
a
vision for
Iraq post-Saddam”. The activities of the Iraqi opposition should
be
rolled into
that;
•
selling the
OFF programme more convincingly as a humanitarian
programme;
and
•
dispensing
with the southern NFZ patrols.
102.
Mr Cook also
wanted to confront Secretary Powell on the scale of Iraq’s
illegal
oil
trade.
103.
In a
manuscript comment on Mr Gooderham’s letter, Sir John Kerr,
FCO
Permanent
Under Secretary, suggested to Mr Westmacott that the policy
outlined by
Mr Cook was
unlikely to “survive in the cold light of a Washington
morning”.59
It
seemed
a recipe
for infuriating allies in the Gulf (due to the proposal to dispense
with the
southern
NFZ patrols) and would mean abandoning hope of P5 unity (because
the
‘Contract
with the Iraqi People’ suggested that the target was no longer the
suspension
of
sanctions if Iraq stopped developing WMD, but Saddam Hussein
himself). Sir John
continued:
“I much preferred the policy in your [Mr Westmacott’s] note. I
wonder if he
[Mr Cook]
read it?”
104.
Sir William
Patey told the Inquiry that the ‘Contract with the Iraqi People’
had been
developed
in response to the US “drumbeats” for regime change in Iraq, and
was:
“… our way
in the Foreign Office of trying to signal that we didn’t think
Saddam was
a good
thing and it would be great if he went, but we didn’t have an
explicit policy for
trying get
rid of him.”60
105.
Mr Cook and
Secretary Powell met on 6 February.61
The British
Embassy
Washington
reported that they had discussed the need to regain the initiative
on Iraq
through a
radical new approach to secure common objectives and to get the
public
emphasis
back on Iraq’s WMD, including by moving from a sanctions debate to
an arms
control
debate and narrowing the definition of dual-use items.
106.
Mr Cook
suggested working on a ‘Contract with the Iraqi People’ and that:
“In
return, we
must bring smuggling under control, in particular by bringing the
Turkish trade
within
Oil-for-Food.” Mr Cook pointed out that the US would have to
“reduce drastically”
the number
of holds it had placed on Iraqi contracts.
59
Manuscript
comment Kerr on Letter Gooderham to Westmacott, 5 February 2001,
‘Iraq: Policy Review:
Foreign
Secretary’s Visit’.
60
Public
hearing, 24 November 2009, page 27.
61
Telegram
126 Washington to FCO London, 7 February 2001, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Meeting with Colin
Powell:
Iraq’.
210