The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
151.
Cabinet was
not told about the difficulties in reaching agreement on
the
content of
a UN resolution.
152.
Cabinet
recognised that the strategy being pursued would lead to the
use
of military
force if Saddam Hussein failed to disarm, but it was not asked
to
address the
strategy or to endorse any decision.
153.
Mr Campbell
wrote that:
•
Mr Blair
had explained that the dossier “brought together accumulated
evidence
about
Iraq’s attempts to build WMD, part historical, part
intelligence‑based” –
“not saying
that he [Saddam Hussein] was about to launch an attack on
London,
but we were
saying there was an attempt to build a WMD programme in
a
significant
way”. Mr Blair had “made clear we were still focused on the
UNSCR
route and
if he doesn’t comply there will have to be international military
action”,
and that
Saddam Hussein would not comply “unless he thinks the threat is
real”.
•
Mr John
Prescott, the Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Leader of the
Labour
Party, had
said that the Cabinet was “in this together” and Mr Blair had
“done
a brilliant
job of moving the US down the UN route and we should stick with
him
and stick
together”.
•
Mr Gordon
Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had made “a few
long‑term
points for
the US, the need to think through post‑Saddam, the importance of
the
MEPP
[Middle East Peace Process]”.
•
Ms Patricia
Hewitt, the Trade and Industry Secretary, had suggested that
the
Attorney
General should come to Cabinet to explain the legal
position.
•
Ms Clare
Short, the International Development Secretary, has said that “if
we
are going
to have collective responsibility we should have a collective
decision”;
there was
“no doubt that Saddam was dedicated to possessing WMD but re
the
UN there’s
a double standard vis‑a‑vis Israel”.
•
Mr Blair
had said “he believed it would be folly for Britain to go against
the US
on a
fundamental policy” and that he “really believed in getting rid of
bad people
like
Saddam”.
•
Mr Hoon
had said “the ultimate objective was disarmament and that
the
weapons
inspectors are a means to an end. The clearer we are that we
would
use force,
the likelier it may be that we don’t have to.” On “why now?”,
Mr Hoon
had said
Saddam’s record, his use of WMD and the continued
development.
•
Mr Blair
had argued that the US could become unilateralist or it could “be
part of
a wider
agenda on Africa, MEPP, Afghanistan”.46
46
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
224