9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
that
“presented corresponding risks for an increase in the insurgency
and sectarian
violence”.
146.
The ISG also
discussed the anticipated report of the Red Team and
recognised
that the UK
would need to consider what its “legacy” in MND(SE) would be. The
FCO
and MOD
were commissioned to produce an assessment of the UK legacy in
MND(SE)
one year
on, for discussion at the next meeting.
147.
In response to
that commission, the IPU produced a paper on the UK’s
objectives for
MND(SE).71
The paper
suggested that objectives for the South-East
were that
it should:
•
identify
itself as part of Iraq, connected to Baghdad;
•
engage in a
constructive but not servile relationship with Iran;
•
have
credible local government delivering effective
services;
•
have
security forces loyal to the state and capable of providing
sufficient law and
order to
“avert a descent into full-blown criminality and
chaos”;
•
improve the
supply of services such as electricity in the short term and have
a
credible
long-term development plan; and
•
achieve
economic sustainability.
148.
The challenges
to achieving those objectives included Saddam Hussein’s
legacy
of neglect
in the South, significant differences in political vision, militia
activity, poor local
governance
and tribal violence.
149.
According to
the paper:
“We cannot
stay in Southern Iraq indefinitely and our aim remains to reduce
our
military
presence over the next 12 months. Against our broader global
strategy, our
plans are
to draw down significant numbers of personnel next Autumn. We
therefore
need to
take decisions on what we should do in the interim to give the
South-East
the best
possible chance of going it alone.”
150.
A telegram
from the British Embassy Office Basra was supplied to be read
in
conjunction
with the IPU paper.72
On the UK
legacy in MND(SE) it advised:
“The South
cannot be seen in isolation from developments in Baghdad. Our
ability to
achieve
anything will be affected by the outcome of the constitutional
debate and the
future
balance of power following elections. The legacy we leave in the
South will to
a large
part be dependent on outside factors, such as the Sunni reaction in
central
Iraq to the
Constitution.
71
Paper Iraq
Policy Unit, 26 August 2005, ‘MND(South East) in Autumn 2006:
Discussion Paper’.
72
eGram
12326/05 Basra to FCO London, 1 September 2005, ‘Southern Iraq: The
Legacy’.
513