The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
792.
In a reference
to international security, Mr Blair identified “two dangerous
and
ruthless
men – Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic” as the cause of “many
of our
problems”.
Iraq had been “reduced to poverty, with political life stultified
through fear”.
Mr Blair
suggested that international security should be addressed at the
NATO Summit
by
establishing a new framework:
“No longer
is our existence as states under threat … our actions are guided by
a
more subtle
blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the
values
we cherish.
In the end values and interests merge. If we can establish and
spread
the values
of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then
that is in
our
national interest too.
“The most
pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the
circumstances
in which we
should get actively involved in other people’s conflicts.
Non-interference
has long
been considered an important principle of international order. And
it is not
one we
would want to jettison too readily … But the principle of
non-interference
must be
qualified …
“So how do
we decide when and whether to intervene.”
793.
Mr Blair
set out “five major considerations” to guide such a
decision:
“First, are
we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for
righting
humanitarian
distress; but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing
with
dictators.
Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? We should
always
give peace
every chance, as we have in the case of Kosovo. Third, on the basis
of
a practical
assessment of the situation, are there military operations we can
sensibly
and
prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? In
the past, we
talked too
much of exit strategies. But having made a commitment we cannot
simply
walk away
once the fight is over; better to stay with moderate numbers of
troops
than return
for repeat performances with large numbers. And finally, do we
have
national
interests involved?”
794.
Mr Blair
argued that acts of genocide could never be a purely internal
matter, and
that when
oppression produced massive flows of refugees which unsettled
neighbouring
countries,
that could “properly be described as ‘threats to international
peace and
security’”;
a reference to the provisions of the UN Charter (see Box, ‘The
Charter
framework
for the use of force’, earlier in this Section).
795.
The five
considerations were not to be “absolute tests”; they were the
“kind
of issues
we need to think about in deciding in the future when and whether
we
will intervene”.
796.
Mr Blair
also argued that the new rules would only work if there were
reformed
international
institutions to apply them and that “If we want a world ruled by
law and
by international
co-operation then we have to support the UN as its central
pillar.”
174