6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
17.
The FCO
Research Analysts (RA) provided expert support and background for
the
policy
recommendations made by MED and the Iraq Planning Unit (IPU), which
was
established
in February 2003.7
The FCO
told the Inquiry that one analyst worked full-
time on
Iraq during 2001, increasing to two from mid-2002.8
RA also
acted as the contact
point
within government for the US State Department’s Future of Iraq
Project.9
18.
After the
closure of the British Embassy Baghdad on 12 January 1992, the UK
had
no
diplomatic relations with Iraq.
19.
In other cases
where diplomatic relations have been interrupted, the UK has
often
maintained
a British Interests Section within a friendly Embassy. The FCO told
the
Inquiry it
did not consider opening an Interests Section in Iraq staffed with
permanent
UK
diplomatic staff.10
Instead,
Russia acted as the UK’s Protecting Power in Baghdad
from
November 1992 until the invasion, but did not provide the UK with
political reporting
from Iraq.
20.
The FCO told
the Inquiry that, from the late 1990s, junior UK diplomats based
in
Amman
visited Baghdad about every six months to check on UK property, in
particular
the Embassy
building, deal with locally-employed staff, call on resident
diplomats from
other
countries and glean what information they could on the situation in
Iraq.11
On
return to
Amman, the UK diplomats produced reports containing political and
economic
information,
some of which are described later in this Section.
21.
Initially, the
reports from Amman had an administrative focus. The FCO
explicitly
advised
visiting diplomats from Amman not to travel to Basra, as such
visits would not
be
consistent with that purpose and might suggest the UK was
increasing contact with
Iraq.12
Visiting
diplomats were instructed to “avoid all political
contacts”.
22.
In July 1998,
FCO Economic Advisers asked the British Embassy Amman for help
in
monitoring
Iraq’s economy, explaining that basic economic indicators were
unavailable
and that
those with an interest in the issue had to rely on “snippets of
information, on
anecdote,
and on speculation”.13
The Embassy
was asked to make a “modest effort” to
gather
economic information during routine administrative visits to Iraq,
focusing on:
•
living
standards;
•
employment/unemployment
and the structure of economic activity;
7
Briefing
Wilson, November 2009.
8
Email FCO
to Iraq Inquiry, 3 June 2013, ‘FCO Research Analysts’.
9
Briefing
Wilson, November 2009.
10
Paper FCO,
17 November 2010, ‘Note for the Iraq Inquiry on the FCO’s
diplomatic contacts in Baghdad,
1990-2003’.
11 Paper
FCO, 17 November 2010, ‘Note for the Iraq Inquiry on the FCO’s
diplomatic contacts in Baghdad,
1990-2003’.
12
Telegram
366 Amman to FCO London, 16 July 1997, ‘Proposed visit to Iraq’;
Telegram 390 FCO London
to Amman,
18 July 1997, ‘Iraq: proposed visit’.
13
Letter
Economic Advisers [junior official] to Amman [junior official], 15
July 1998, ‘Reporting Economic
Developments
in Iraq’.
117