3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
881.
Mr Blair
began his speech:
“Last
Friday was an important day for the world. After months of debate,
the United
Nations
came together and made its will plain. Saddam now has to decide:
he
can either
disarm voluntarily … or he can defy the world, in which case he
will
be disarmed
by force.”297
882.
Most of the
speech focused on the broader threat posed by WMD and
terrorism,
stating
that they were linked, and the need to counter them by moving
forward the
Middle East
Peace Process, being prepared to help failed or failing nations to
recover,
and
creating “bridges of understanding” between religions, and
coalitions of force
buttressed
by a coalition of common ideas and a shared agenda.
883.
Drawing
together the capabilities of Iraq and North Korea, Mr Blair
warned:
“States
which are failed, which repress their people brutally, in which
notions
of
democracy and the rule of law are alien, share the same absence of
rational
boundaries
to their actions as the terrorist. Iraq has used WMD. North
Korea’s
admission
that it has a programme to produce Highly Enriched Uranium
was
an
important confession. We know that North Korea has traded ballistic
missile
technology.
We know there are other highly unstable states who want to get
their
hands on
Highly Enriched Uranium. With it a nuclear weapon could be a step
away.
Just
reflect on that and the danger is clear.
“And
terrorism and WMD have the potential, at least, to be directly
linked …”
884.
Mr Blair
added that Al Qaida could and would buy and use WMD:
“So these
are new and different dangers …
“… above
all the international community needs to be unified in its
response.”
885.
Mr Blair
concluded that it would be “irresponsible to ignore the threat”
posed
by
terrorism and WMD. President Bush recognised that “full US
engagement and
leadership”
was needed, as the “decision to go through the UN on Iraq”
showed.
886.
In his
diaries, Mr Campbell wrote:
“We were
also having to get the balance right re Bush. There was no point
him
[TB] just
getting up there and putting the US line but he did not want to be
seen as
anything
other than supportive. The question was how you weave in the
argument
about
maximising influence without being explicit.”298
297
The
National Archives, 11 November 2002, PM speech
at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet.
298
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
357