The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
The draft
also identified the immediate priorities for the UK, including that
continuing
to “make
military plans and preparations in case military action” was
required to “force
compliance
with UNSCRs”.
Mr Lee
sent a copy of the draft to Mr Hoon’s Private Office,
commenting that, while the
text was
“helpful”, it did not “go far enough in providing direction for
current military activity
and an
information strategy”.327
Mr Lee
did not expect the draft to move forward until there
was a clear
UN position.
Sir David
Manning informed members of the Ministerial Committee on Defence
and
Overseas
Policy on 22 October that Mr Blair had agreed draft UK
strategic objectives
for Iraq.
The draft
objectives agreed by Mr Blair were unchanged from those
proposed by
Mr Bowen
on 4 October.328
The draft
objectives underpinned subsequent policy statements both to explain
the UK’s
position
and to maintain the pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply with the
demands
of the
international community.
The UK’s
objectives were formally announced by Mr Straw on 7 January
2003.329
823.
The Chiefs
of Staff meeting on 23 October was informed that time
was
running out
if the UK wanted to keep open the option of deploying ground
forces
in the
combat phase of any military operations.
824.
Adm Boyce
directed that a further submission should be made to
Mr Hoon.
825.
An update from
Lt Gen Reith to Lt Gen Pigott on 21 October,
entitled ‘The Northern
Axis –
Current Thinking’, advised that, while the UK’s “preferred option
remain[ed]
leadership
of the Northern Axis”, an independent British command was now
unlikely.330
He also
advised that the package would need to be reinforced with a second
formation
to
establish a “genuine manoeuvre capability”; and that analysis had
indicated that
“additional
forces would be required for such tasks as protection of LOCs
[Lines of
Communication]
and handling of EPW [Enemy Prisoners of War]”.
826.
The timelines
for action were discussed at the Chiefs of Staff meeting
on
827.
The Chiefs of
Staff were informed that there was “no discernible position on
UK
forces” in
Turkey. Lt Gen Reith suggested that a UK tactical lead on
the northern option
327
Minute Lee
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 7 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Strategic
Policy Objectives’.
328
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 22 October 2002, ‘Iraq’ attaching
Cabinet Office Paper ‘Iraq: Strategic
Policy
Objectives’.
329
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7 January
2003, column 4‑6WS.
330
Paper CJO
to MA/DCDS(C), 21 October 2002, ‘The Northern Axis – Current
Thinking’.
331
Minutes, 23
October 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
302