6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
•
The size and
composition of a UK military contribution to the US‑led invasion
of
Iraq was
largely discretionary. The US wanted some UK capabilities
(including
Special
Forces) to use UK bases, and the involvement of the UK military to
avoid the
perception
of unilateral US military action. The primary impetus to maximise
the size
of the UK
contribution and the recommendations on its composition came from
the
Armed
Forces, with the agreement of Mr Hoon.
•
From late
February 2002, the UK judged that Saddam Hussein’s regime could
only
be removed
by a US‑led invasion.
•
In April 2002,
the MOD advised that, if the US mounted a major military operation,
the
UK should
contribute a division comprising three brigades. That was perceived
to be
commensurate
with the UK’s capabilities and the demands of the campaign.
Anything
smaller
risked being compared adversely to the UK’s contribution to the
liberation of
Kuwait in
1991.
•
The MOD saw a
significant military contribution as a means of influencing
US
decisions.
•
Mr Blair
and Mr Hoon wanted to keep open the option of contributing
significant
forces for
ground operations as long as possible, but between May and
mid‑October
consistently
pushed back against US assumptions that the UK would
provide
a division.
•
Air and
maritime forces were offered to the US for planning purposes in
September.
•
The MOD
advised in October that the UK was at risk of being excluded from
US
plans
unless it offered ground forces, “Package 3”, on the same basis as
air and
maritime
forces. That could also significantly reduce the UK’s vulnerability
to US
requests to
provide a substantial and costly contribution to post‑conflict
operations.
•
From August
until December 2002, other commitments meant that UK
planning
for Package
3 was based on providing a divisional headquarters and an
armoured
brigade for
operations in northern Iraq. That was seen as the maximum
practicable
contribution
the UK could generate within the predicted timescales for US
action.
•
The deployment
was dependent on Turkey’s agreement to the transit of UK
forces.
•
Mr Blair
agreed to offer Package 3 on 31 October 2002.
•
That decision
and its potential consequences were not formally considered by
a
Cabinet
Committee or reported to Cabinet.
•
In December
2002, the deployment of 3 Commando Brigade was identified as a
way
for the UK
to make a valuable contribution in the initial stages of a land
campaign
if transit
through Turkey was refused. The operational risks were not
explicitly
addressed.
•
Following a
visit to Turkey on 7 to 8 January 2003, Mr Hoon concluded that
there
would be no
agreement to the deployment of UK ground forces through
Turkey.
•
By that time,
in any case, the US had asked the UK to deploy for operations
in
southern
Iraq.
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