The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses the final attempts to secure support for the UK, US
and
Spanish
draft resolution tabled in the Security Council on 7 March 2003
and, when that
failed, the
UK Government’s decision to take military action without the
support of the
majority of
the Security Council.
2.
Other key
developments during that time are addressed elsewhere in
the
Report, including:
•
provision
of advice by Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General, on the legal
basis
for
military action to secure Iraq’s compliance with its disarmament
obligations,
which is
addressed in Section 5;
•
planning
for military operations in southern Iraq, which is addressed
in
Section 6.2;
•
UK planning
and preparations for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, which
are
addressed
in Section 6.5; and
•
assessments
and advice on Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and
ballistic
missile
capabilities, its intention to conceal them from inspections and
its
intentions
for their use in response to a military attack, which are
addressed
in Section
4.3. That Section also addresses the withdrawal after the conflict
of
three
streams of intelligence reporting which had influenced judgements
about
Iraq’s
capabilities and intentions.
3.
The Inquiry’s
conclusions in relation to the development of the UK
Government’s
strategy
and options on Iraq before the invasion began, including the way in
which the
policy was
developed and decisions were taken, are contained in Section
7.
4.
In an
attempt to secure support in the Security Council for the
second
resolution,
Mr Blair decided on 8 March to propose delaying a decision
and
identifying
specific tests as the basis to determine whether Saddam
Hussein
intended to
co-operate.
5.
Mr Blair
began by consulting Mr Ricardo Lagos, the Chilean President,
who
agreed the
proposal was worth exploring, although he thought more time
would
be
needed.
6.
The UK’s
attempts, during February and early March 2003, to reach
agreement
with the US
on the text of a draft resolution stating that Iraq had failed to
take the final
opportunity
to comply with its obligations and to secure international support
for that
position,
and the opposition of France, Russia and others, are set out in
Section 3.7.
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