4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
206.
The version of
the dossier sent to Mr Campbell was the 20 June draft of
the
dossier
sent to Sir David Manning and others, including Mr Campbell,
on 21 June; it
did not
include the later draft of the WMD paper produced by
Mr Scarlett in mid-August.
207.
Mr Campbell’s
meeting on 5 September was attended by Sir David
Manning,
Mr Scarlett,
Mr Miller, Mr McKane, Mr Desmond Bowen, who was
about to
succeed
Mr McKane, Mr Wright, Mr Chaplin, Mr John
Williams and Mr Paul Hamill,
Communication
and Information Centre (CIC).94
208.
Reporting the
outcome of the meeting to Mr Powell, Mr Campbell
wrote:
•
There would
be a “substantial rewrite” with Mr Scarlett and Mr Miller
“in charge”.
•
The
structure would be “as per TB’s [Mr Blair’s]
discussion”.
•
It had been
agreed that there had to be “real intelligence material”
in the
document.
•
Mr Scarlett
would take the draft to the US on Friday 13
September.95
209.
Commenting on
the meeting, Mr Campbell wrote that the dossier:
“… had to
be revelatory and we needed to show that it was new and informative
and
part of a
bigger case. John Williams … was offering to write it full time.
John Scarlett
was clearly
aware of the responsibility, he was so serious … He warned us
that
there was
very little re nuclear.”96
210.
Following the
meeting, Mr Miller recorded the agreement on a revised
structure
for the
dossier, and who would be responsible for action on each of the
seven sections:
“•
Section 1:
Background to the bloody nature of Saddam’s regime. How he
gained
and retains
power. [Action:
FCO/MED]
•
Section 2:
Saddam’s use of power … Human rights abuses. [Action:
FCO/MED]
•
Section 3:
Short link section covering the international community’s demand
to
dismantle
Iraq’s WMD capability … to ensure Iraq’s regional ambitions did
not
cause
further instability. [Action:
Assessments Staff]
•
Section 4:
Effects of using WMD and ballistic missiles. Why the
international
community
was right to be concerned then and why we are still concerned
now.
[Action:
Assessments Staff]
•
Section 5:
The history of UN weapons inspections. What UNSCOM found?
What
the Iraqi’s
[sic] subsequently admitted. History of concealment and
obstruction
(including
the withdrawal of UNSCOM and the failure to co-operate
with
UNMOVIC.
What remains unaccounted for? [Action:
Assessments Staff]
94
Email
McKane to Blackshaw, 5 September 2002, ‘Meeting with Alastair
Campbell’.
95
Email
Campbell to Powell, 5 September 2002, [untitled].
96
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
151