The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
931.
The paper
warned that seeking but failing to secure a second resolution
would
increase
many of the risks listed, including by “reducing the effectiveness
of any Day
After work
(so eg increased chance of a power vacuum forming in parts of Iraq
or
external
intervention)”.
932.
On 10
March, the British Embassy Washington reported that the US
had
agreed a
broad outline for the transitional administration of
Iraq:
•
a Civilian
Administrator responsible for key ministries and reporting
to
Coalition
Forces;
•
a UN
Special Co-ordinator responsible for UN agencies and reporting
to
the
Security Council; and
•
an IIA
under Coalition oversight, administering the less
sensitive
ministries.
933.
UK
officials commented that the US seemed to be “moving in the
right
direction”.
No.10 would be asked to inject the UK’s advice on Phase
IV.
934.
Mr Brenton
reported on 10 March that the US had agreed the “broad outlines
of
the
structure of transitional arrangements” in Iraq in the period
between military rule and
Iraqi
government.391
The three
components of the transitional arrangements were:
•
a Civilian
Administrator reporting to Coalition Forces and responsible for
key
ministries;
•
a UN
Special Co-ordinator responsible for UN agencies and reporting to
the
Security
Council; and
•
an IIA to
administer the less sensitive ministries and agencies, under
Coalition
oversight.
935.
There was
agreement in Washington that those arrangements “would need to
be
blessed via
a UNSCR”. The State Department had been commissioned to start work
on
a draft.
But the Coalition would remain in overall control until it felt
comfortable enough
to hand
authority to the Iraqis: the US would “not allow sovereignty to be
passed to
the UN”.
936.
On 10 March,
Sir David Manning wrote to Dr Rice, enclosing a draft
resolution
on post-conflict
Iraq.392
He
described the purpose of the resolution as:
•
to provide
legal and political “cover” for the UK and other nations to
contribute
to reconstruction;
•
to build
support in Iraq and the Arab world for reform;
391
Telegram
321 Washington to London, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After
Planning’.
392
Letter
Manning to Rice, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Post-conflict
administration’.
480