6.3  |  Military equipment (pre-conflict)

174.  The questions for the Group to consider included:

• the equipment requirement – such as the effects required from each package,

quantities, enhancements for particular geographical locations and an

understanding of priorities;

• the justification for it – such as what would “the operational penalties” be for not

providing the item and were there any “operational lessons” that reinforced the

case, for example from the 1990/91 Gulf Conflict;

• alternative solutions;

• the management and timing of the requirement;

• potential risks and wider implications; and

• visibility and presentation – how to “cover” preparing or acquiring the

requirement.

175.  Detailed planning for UORs for potential operations against Iraq began on

22 August with the first weekly Equipment and Sustainability Working Group meeting.77

176.  On 5 September, Mr Hoon requested detailed advice from Mr Ian Lee, who had

replaced Mr Bowen as MOD Director General Operational Policy, on the UORs assumed

within the “preparation cost figures” for the three packages, “covering the ‘what’, ‘why’

and ‘when’ for each UOR”.78

177.  Mr Blair and Mr Hoon agreed on 8 September that the UK should plan

on the basis of a medium scale land contribution but there should be no

visible preparations.

178.  Mr Blair met President Bush at Camp David on 7 September. That meeting is

described in Section 3.4. Before the meeting, Mr Watkins wrote to Sir David Manning on

6 September with an update on US military planning and “the factors informing decisions

on any UK military contribution”.79 For Package 2, he wrote that “some” UORs would

need to be raised at additional cost to the Reserve.

179.  For Package 3, Mr Watkins stated that “even were [Operation] FRESCO80 to end

soon, we could not provide a self-standing division within US timescales”. He continued:

“There would simply not be enough time to carry out the preparations we would

need to make. We would not have enough time to engage industry in order to

improve sustainability (ammunition, etc) and implement UORs to optimise forces

for the theatre and interoperability with the US.”

77  Minute DCDS(EC) to PS/Minister(DP), 24 January 2003, ‘Iraq: OP TELIC UORs’.

78  Minute Watkins to DG Op Pol, 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.

79  Letter Watkins to Manning, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.

80  The operation to address the fire fighters’ strike.

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