The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
advice, but
nevertheless, if definitive advice from the Attorney had been given
prior
to the
adoption of resolution 1441, events would have unfolded rather
differently.”362
“… it has
struck me very forcibly with the benefit of hindsight that that
would have
been
desirable, to say the least, in relation to 1441 because the net
effect was … the
Government
didn’t really know what it was voting for … the Foreign Secretary
and
Sir Jeremy
had a very clear view of what they thought the resolution meant.
Michael
Wood had a
very clear view which was a rather different view, but the one
person
whose view
actually mattered hadn’t even been asked at that
stage.”363
992.
Ms Adams told
the Inquiry that Lord Goldsmith’s advice at an earlier
stage:
“… would
have influenced the statements that were made about the resolution
after
its
adoption … the Explanation of Vote which was made. Normally, when
you have
a
resolution negotiated, if you don’t achieve everything that you
want to achieve
in the
negotiation and you end up with a less than clear text, it is a
classic way to
reinforce
one’s interpretation by stating clearly that you think it means a
certain
thing …
our statement was arguably not inconsistent with the view that the
Attorney
had
reached, but it could have been clearer and I think some of the
things that were
said …
about what automaticity did or didn’t mean and these kind of
issues, but if
there had
been a very definitive legal view, then perhaps that would have fed
into a
clearer
Explanation of Vote.”364
993.
Lord Goldsmith
wrote that there was a view within his Office that he “should
not
provide a
running commentary on the drafts as they emerged”.365
He only saw
what were
“effectively
snapshots provided … for information”. His role should be to
“provide advice
on the
legal effect of the final, agreed wording”. That seemed to him “a
valid position”
which he
“understood to be consistent with the role adopted by his
predecessors”.
Lord
Goldsmith wrote that that was what he “had in mind” when he told
Mr Blair in their
meeting on
22 October that “it would not be possible to give a final view on
the legal
effect of
the resolution until it had been adopted”.
994.
Asked to
address the effect greater involvement during the negotiation of
the
resolution
could have had, Lord Goldsmith wrote:
“If my
advice had been provided to the negotiating team at key points in
the later
stage of
the negotiations, I think this may well have influenced the
negotiations and
the
statements that were made about the resolution after its
adoption.
362
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, page 9.
363
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 13‑14.
364
Public
hearing, 30 June 2010, pages 15‑16.
365
Statement,
4 January 2011, paragraph 1.13.
374