The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“… worse
than many understood. It was indigenous, self-generating and run
by
highly
sophisticated and intelligent individuals capable of shifting their
strategy in
response to
developments on the ground.” 24
47.
In a report on
5 August, the British Embassy Baghdad observed that “there is
an
Iraqi face
being put on the operation” and that providing strong Iraqi leaders
to take over
once the
MNF-I had played its part was Gen Casey’s condition for MNF-I
involvement.25
48.
Also on 5
August Mr Simon Collis, British Consul General in Basra, reported
that the
detention
on 3 August of four members of the Office of the Martyr Sadr had
increased
tension
between the Sadrist militia and the MNF-I in Basra City, Maysan and
Nasiriyah.26
49.
The tension
was such that Mr Collis reported “there is a fair probability of
mortar
attack
attempts on British bases tonight, possibly including our
Consulate”.
50.
A report from
Baghdad on the same day recorded heavy fighting in Najaf
between
the MNF-I
and Sadrist militia plus an insurgent attack on the police in
Mosul.27
51.
In order to
show that the IIG was in charge of the situation, Prime Minister
Allawi
planned to
announce the introduction of the death penalty, and to take steps
to manage
media
coverage.
52.
On 6 August,
Mr John Sawers, FCO Director General Political, chaired a meeting
of
senior
officials to discuss developments in Iraq.28
53.
On security,
the meeting was told that:
“There had
been a spike in attacks in the last 48 hours. MOD’s initial
assessment
was that
the security situation was not yet unmanageable and that it
probably did
not represent
a single, co-ordinated, plan. It was important that the MNF
was
measured in
its response and did not undermine progress towards the
Iraqiisation
of security
tasks.”
54.
Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary told the meeting that Mr Blair was concerned
that
neither an
Iraqi security strategy nor an MNF-I internal review of the
Iraqiisation process
had yet
appeared.
55.
The security
strategy was particularly important for demonstrating publicly that
the
IIG had a
plan to tackle the security situation. The FCO was instructed to
press Prime
Minister
Allawi on the importance of issuing a public statement
soon.
24
Letter Owen
to Quarrey, 4 August 2004, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Conversation with
US Secretary of State,
4 August’.
25
Telegram 98
Baghdad to FCO London, 5 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Security: Briefing the
Prime Minister’.
26
Telegram 86
Basra to FCO London, 5 August 2004, ‘Iraq: OMS Activity in
Basra’.
27
Telegram
103, Baghdad to FCO London, 5 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Security:
Ministerial Committee on
National
[Security]’.
28
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sawers, 6 August 2004,
‘Iraq’.
404