Executive
Summary
493.
Lord Goldsmith
should have been asked to provide written advice which
fully
reflected
the position on 17 March, explained the legal basis on which the UK
could take
military
action and set out the risks of legal challenge.
494.
The advice
should have addressed the significance of the exchange of letters
of
14 and 15
March and how, in the absence of agreement from the majority of
members
of the
Security Council, the point had been reached that Iraq had failed
to take the final
opportunity
offered by resolution 1441.
495.
The advice
should have been provided to Ministers and senior officials
whose
responsibilities
were directly engaged and should have been made available to
Cabinet.
496.
The ingrained
belief that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained chemical
and
biological
warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and if possible
enhance its
capabilities,
including at some point in the future a nuclear capability, and was
pursuing
an active
policy of deception and concealment, had underpinned UK policy
towards Iraq
since the
Gulf Conflict ended in 1991.
497.
While the
detail of individual JIC Assessments on Iraq varied, this core
construct
remained in
place.
498.
Security
Council resolutions adopted since 1991 demanded Iraq’s
disarmament
and the
re-admission of inspectors, and imposed sanctions in the absence of
Iraqi
compliance
with those – and other – obligations. Agreement to those
resolutions
indicated
that doubts about whether Iraq had disarmed were widely
shared.
499.
In parallel,
by 2000, the wider risk of proliferation was regarded as a major
threat.
There was
heightened concern about:
•
the danger
of proliferation, particularly that countries of concern might
obtain
nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles; and
•
the
potential risk that terrorist groups which were willing to use them
might gain
access to
chemical and biological agents and, possibly, nuclear material,
and
the means
to deliver them.
500.
These concerns
were reinforced after 9/11.
501.
The view
conveyed in JIC Assessments between December 2000 and
March
2002 was
that, despite the considerable achievements of UNSCOM and the
IAEA
between
1991 and December 1998, including dismantling Iraq’s nuclear
programme,
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