4.4  |  The search for WMD

not more likely to come in the form of testimony from scientists and other

Iraqi personnel, and documentation. That sort of evidence is no less valid.”

161.  Mr Straw noted MOD concern that the last point “might be interpreted as moving

the goalposts”. It needed “to be deployed with care”, but it was “not new”. It was “why

we placed such emphasis on the UN inspectors conducting secure interviews”. In

Mr Straw’s view, it carried “more weight than the claim raised in some US newspapers

that the Iraqis may have destroyed their WMD in the days immediately prior to the war.

For that to carry any credibility at all it would have to be backed with very convincing

evidence of such destruction.”

162.  Mr Straw recommended that the UK should, more realistically for the medium

rather than the short term, continue to try “to change US minds” about credible

independent validation of WMD discoveries by UNMOVIC or the IAEA. Dr Blix would

“retire from the scene in June” and the task had:

“… now changed, to one essentially of observation and reporting. Coalition forces

will do the detective work. But the fact is that the inspectors still carry the most

weight with the audiences we need to convince, in the Security Council or the media.

It would be odd if the Coalition was now to refuse to co-operate with the weapons

inspectors after we made this a centrepiece of our case against Saddam.”

163.  Sir David Manning commented to Mr Blair:

“You should be aware. We are pushing the WMD dossier [issue] hard: but J[ack]

S[traw]’s points are well taken.”80

164.  On 1 May, Mr Watkins sent No.10 briefing for Mr Blair’s meeting with Secretary

Rumsfeld at Chequers the following day.81 Mr Watkins suggested that Mr Blair remind

Secretary Rumsfeld of the stronger political and presentational pressures in the UK

to find verifiable evidence of Iraqi WMD programmes. The US saw no short-term role

for UNMOVIC and there was little appetite in the longer term. Mr Watkins proposed

that Mr Blair say that: “suitably reconstituted – UN inspectors would confer maximum

international credibility to WMD finds.”

165.  Mr Matthew Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, commented to

Mr Blair: “No way that Rumsfeld will agree this.”82

166.  Mr Blair and Mr Hoon met Secretary Rumsfeld at Chequers on 2 May.83 There is no

indication in the record of the meeting that WMD was discussed.

80  Manuscript comment Manning to Prime Minister on Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 2 May 2003,

‘Iraq: WMD Detection and Elimination’.

81  Letter Watkins to Rycroft, 1 May 2003, ‘Meeting with the US Defense Secretary – 2 May 2003’.

82  Manuscript comment Rycroft on Letter Watkins to Rycroft, 1 May 2003, ‘Meeting with the US Defense

Secretary – 2 May 2003’.

83  Letter Cannon to Watkins, 2 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister and Defence Secretary’s Meeting with

Rumsfeld, 2 May’.

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