The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
593.
Mr Lee’s
advice was copied to Mr Desmond Bowen, Deputy Head of the
Cabinet
Office
Overseas and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec) and
Mr William
Ehrman, FCO
Director
General Defence and Intelligence.
594.
Mr Hoon
agreed to Mr Lee’s recommendations on 3 April, noting that the
Chiefs
of Staff
would “provide advice in due course on the geographical area that
UK forces
595.
Mr Hoon
tried without success to engage Secretary Rumsfeld on the question
of
ORHA during
their conversation on 3 April.350
596.
Mr Hoon
told Secretary Rumsfeld that the oil infrastructure in the South
had been
secured
with very little damage and it was possible that pumping would
restart soon.
There was
no reason why the Coalition could not leave Iraq in a better state
than it
had found
it, but he was “keen not to have British troops tied down in Iraq
for too long”.
UK forces
had made good contacts with local municipalities and were
introducing the
well‑tried
concept of Joint Commissions. Mr Hoon suggested that ORHA
should focus
on its
humanitarian role and “go cautiously on the political/governmental
dimension”.
597.
On 7 April,
the Chiefs of Staff took the view:
•
that the
boundaries of any extension of the AO should be clearly
defined;
•
that the UK
should not be over-committed; and
•
any move
north should be dependent on the successful conclusion
of
operations
in Basra.
598.
On 11
April, the UK AO was extended to al-Amara in Maysan
province.
599.
Lt Gen Reith
circulated a revised draft Operational Concept on 4 April.
The revised
text
reflected comments made by the Chiefs of Staff on 31 March and was
to be
approved
out of committee if no further comments were received by 10
April.351
The revised
draft recommended that:
“Any
extension of UK responsibility beyond Basra province should
preferably be
achieved
through support from Coalition partners, who would deploy forces
to
operate
under a UK two-star divisional HQ.”
600.
The Inquiry
has seen no evidence of any further comments on the
draft.
349
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 3 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Draft Operational
Concept for Phase 4’.
350
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 3 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Rumsfeld: 3 April 2003’.
351
Minute
SECCOS to PSO/CDS, 4 April 2003, ‘OP COS Paper: Subject – Op TELIC
Phase 4 – The Joint
Commander’s
Draft Operational Concept’ attaching Paper Reith, 3 April 2003,
‘Operation TELIC
Phase
IV:
The Joint
Commander’s Draft Operational Concept’.
106