The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
which the
UK should engage, including clearance of the port, the contract for
which was
out to
tender.
404.
At the end of
the discussion Mr Brown highlighted three areas for
follow-up:
•
further
discussion, including with the Iraqis, of the timeframe for Basra
PIC;
•
an enhanced
UK effort on economic development, including the port;
and
•
further
US/UK discussion of long-term force requirements.
405.
Mr Brown
asked Mr McDonald to take forward work on these three strands
of
activity
during his visit to Washington the following week.
406.
On 19
September, MOD officials sought Mr Browne’s agreement for Maj
Gen Binns
to release
up to 10 further internees in two groups of five, if necessary, “as
a bridging
measure
pending negotiation of a longer-term agreement”.199
The minute
explained:
“… GOC
MND(SE) is concerned that the discussions have hit an awkward
patch
and that
the already fragile security and political dynamics may unravel,
causing
a breakdown
in the cessation of violence. There are already some initial
signs
that JAM
Secret Cells are stepping up efforts to resume attacks on the COB …
an
MND(SE)
response to these attacks may trigger a wider escalation of
violence.
“… we wish
to give the GOC the flexibility to manage these discussions in the
short-
term,
pending agreement to a longer term negotiating strategy. The GOC
believes
that it may
be necessary to release one or possibly even two further batches
of
five
internees in order to prevent a breakdown in the discussions. The
GOC judges
that a
release of up to ten people over Ramadan would be enough to buy
sufficient
time
properly to consider with our interlocutors how to align our other
activities to
deliver our
desired long term objectives. If we do not have this flexibility,
and delay
any further
releases until we have agreed a longer term plan, there is serious
risk
that the
Secret Cells will gain sufficient authority within JAM to resume
their attacks
against the
coalition.”
407.
The advice
reported that only one of those proposed for release by JAM1
had
previously
been judged to be high risk, and MOD officials had informed MND(SE)
that
he should
only be released if “absolutely essential”. Advice on long-term
strategy would
be
accompanied by advice on presentation, following a request by
Mr Browne in light of
comments
made by Gen Petraeus in his testimony to Congress.
408.
On 20
September, Mr Browne marked the advice
“agreed”.200
409.
Mr Richard
Jones, British Consul General in Basra, wrote to Mr Frank
Baker, FCO
Iraq Group,
on 20 September, to provide some background on the “Mohan
Initiative” as
199
Minute Keay
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 19 September 2007, ‘Op TELIC:
Discussions with JAM’.
200
Minute Keay
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 19 September 2007, ‘Op TELIC:
Discussions with JAM’
including
manuscript comment Browne.
260