The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
despite
reported comments by the former Commander of 4 Brigade that up
to
50 percent
of his unit was sympathetic to JAM, they successfully and
impartially
policed a
cease‑fire in Amara between JAM and Badr. In Operation SINBAD
in
Basra units
conducted cordon and search operations independently and
effectively
and in one
instance intervened in a public order disturbance. We judge 10th
Division
is slowly
improving and gaining confidence, but it remains prone to
interference from
local
government and militia pressure. It is likely to prove fragile if
confronted by
serious
Shia militia violence.”1208
1314.
On 18 January,
Dr Rosalind Marsden, Consul General in Basra,
produced
the
first consolidated weekly report from MND(SE).1209
She
highlighted a number of
difficulties
including:
•
the
Provincial Council’s disengagement with MNF;
•
a
requirement to replace or dissolve the Emergency Security
Committee;
•
a
requirement to appoint a new Chief of Police; and
•
a continued
need to tackle death squads and high‑level corruption in the
police.
1315.
In contrast to
the MOD’s assessment that 69 percent of police stations were at
a
level
sufficient for transition, Dr Marsden assessed that 56 percent
were ready and that
police
trainers had been able to operate normally in 80 percent of the
stations visited –
in others
“they have been turned away politely”. Dr Marsden also stated
that the transfer
of land to
allow construction of a new Central Prison for Basra had finally
been agreed in
December
2006.
1316.
In his end of
tour report, dated 19 January, Maj Gen Shirreff
stated:
“Mission
success for Britain depends on a capable, confident IA and the last
six
months has
witnessed both highs and lows. The mutiny of 2/4/10 [2nd
Battalion,
4th
Brigade, 10th Division] and the failure of 4 (IA) Bde [4th Brigade]
to control
the looting
of Camp Abu Naji in August were the obvious lows and
demonstrated
that the
‘hands off’ approach to training the IA adopted by the UK was
inadequate.
Arguably,
no other army in the world has greater depth of experience in
training
indigenous
armies than the British and yet we have not been true to ourselves.
We
have not
lived, trained and fought alongside them, preferring a centralised
MiTT and
a far more
hands off approach, in contrast to our US allies. Effectively the
stabilisers
were
removed from the bike too early. The result has been a lacklustre,
inadequately
trained and
supported Division that failed the test when it came.
“Subsequent
to these failures, SINBAD has, for the most part, done much
to
improve IA
capability and confidence … We finish SINBAD with the IA in the
lead.
However,
until the IA in Basra is prepared to fight JAM, the ISF will not be
capable
1208
JIC
Assessment, 17 January 2007, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Prospects in
2007’.
1209
Letter
Marsden to Aldred, 18 January 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly
Report’.
358