The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

circumstances”.371 The letter was copied to No.10, the FCO and the Cabinet Office,

but not to DFID or the MOD.

739.  Ms Short wrote to Mr Blair on 30 October, warning that the international community

was not adequately prepared to cope with the potentially enormous human and financial

costs if Iraq used chemical and biological weapons during any military conflict.372

She concluded:

“I accept of course that preparing for military options, among others, is necessary,

but I am very concerned that in our work across Whitehall and with the USA, the

examination of the humanitarian and possible political consequences of military

action have not been properly explored. We should think through what it would

mean to take responsibility for Iraq after a conflict involving WMD and also make

contingency plans for other possible outcomes such as a fall of the regime without

a war. I am concerned that Whitehall appears to be focusing on military action, not

considering other scenarios, and not thinking through the consequences of the likely

use of chemical weapons.”

740.  Mr Drummond informed Sir David Manning on 8 November that work so far on

the effects of CBW had focused on military and consular dimensions.373 Mr Drummond

said that Ms Short was right that it should be extended to address wider humanitarian

consequences. The DIS had been asked to follow this up, in consultation with DFID.

Once the assessments were in, officials would need to consider how DFID would

pursue them with humanitarian agencies. There were risks that information would be

mishandled, but “there does need to be contingency planning”.

741.  Mr Watkins set out Mr Hoon’s views to No.10 on 11 November.374 Mr Hoon shared

Ms Short’s concerns about the potential use of WMD. The MOD was making sure UK

military personnel were properly protected against the WMD threat, but it was:

“… simply not possible (nor is it the MOD’s role) to extend this protection to the

civilian population of any country with whom we may be engaged in conflict. We can,

however, offer the reassurance that we are working closely, through the Cabinet

Office, with Departments across Whitehall, including DFID, on post-conflict strategy

and are offering as much information as we can make available to assist planning.”

742.  There is no indication of any response from Mr Blair.

371  Letter Dodd to Lowson, 29 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Environmental Contingency Planning’.

372  Letter Short to Blair, 30 October 2002, [untitled].

373  Minute Drummond to Manning, 8 November 2002, ‘Iraq: CBW’.

374  Letter Watkins to Rycroft, 11 November 2002, ‘Possible Iraqi Use of WMD’.

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