The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
144.
A PJHQ
operational summary from 4 August recorded:
“The use of
IEDs against Coalition Forces is increasing and there remains
no
shortage of
raw materials across Iraq from which to draw upon.”69
145.
On 7 August,
Mr Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, told
the
Ad Hoc
Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation that: “Improvised
Explosive Devices
posed an
increasing threat.”70
146.
In August
2003, the security situation in Baghdad continued to
deteriorate.
A bomb
exploded outside the UN headquarters on 19 August, killing 22 UN
staff and
visitors.
Further attacks included a bomb outside the Jordanian Embassy and
several
unsuccessful
attempts to shoot down Coalition aircraft.
147.
The
implications of those attacks are addressed in Section
9.2.
148.
On 27 August,
the Chiefs of Staff were briefed that Maj Gen Lamb was
reviewing
manpower
and equipment requirements.71
The
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
was “constrained
by force protection” and:
“Although
they had ordered armoured vehicles and were reviewing security
until
this was in
place, they were confined to the barracks. Unless a plan drawn up
by
experts,
managed by technically qualified personnel, was put immediately
into
action,
then the consent of the people in the MND(SE) AO [Area of
Operations]
could be
irrevocably lost with all the consequences of strategic
failure.”
149.
Air Chief
Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff,
invited
Major
General Robin Brims, Deputy Chief of Joint Operations, to “remind
theatre that
the
question of force protection needed to be looked at in the broadest
way, taking into
account not
only local expediencies but also strategic implications”,
especially when
taking
decisions about helmets and body armour.
150.
Maj Gen Brims
pointed out that “the British Army did not have any
wheeled
vehicles
with sufficient armour against the threat”. ACM Bagnall invited Air
Vice Marshal
Clive
Loader, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operations), to
investigate the issue.
Air Chief
Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief of the Air Staff, pointed out
that “what was
important
was knowing what may be required in advance so that any
enhancements
could be
put in place quickly”.
151.
On 1
September, MND(SE) produced a Forces and Resources Review to
examine
the
resources required in MND(SE), for both short‑term and enduring
operations.72
69
Paper PJHQ
OPSUM, 4 August 2003, ‘PJHQ Middle East Operations Team OPSUM 075
as at 041700Z
Aug 03 –
D+138’.
70
Minutes, 7
August 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
71
Minutes, 27
August 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
72
Paper
MND(SE), 1 September 2003, ‘HQ MND(SE) Forces and Resources
Review’.
28