The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
with a
congregation of 10,000 people on Friday prayers, thanked me for
delivering
the people
of Basra from this nest of vipers. Elements on the Provincial
Council
weren’t
happy, but they were not going to be happy because they were in
league
with the
Sadrists. So they saw their power being hit at.”196
361.
Mr Blair
was scheduled to speak to President Bush on 29
December.197
The
briefing
note provided by his Private Secretary explained that the UK
expected that
President
Bush would make an announcement in early January that he would
increase
the number
of US troops in Iraq (possibly by as many as 30,000) for at least
the first half
of 2007.
The note explained that such a surge would be “awkward” for the UK
as:
“… our
plans in Basra go in the opposite direction. If a decision is taken
to close
Shaibah
logistics base in the new year, we aim to drawdown by at least
one
battlegroup
at the next troop rotation in May.
“You
should, therefore, probe Bush on his plans, insofar as they are
finalised and
say that we
will need to co‑ordinate closely with them to ensure that we are
seen
to be
working from the same script.”
362.
During their
phone call, Mr Blair told President Bush that he had returned
from
his visit
to Iraq “convinced that we had to see the job
through”.198
He had
found similar
determination
in Baghdad and Basra along with a greater sense of unity of
purpose
amongst
Iraqi politicians.
363.
They discussed
the US evaluation of the Iraq Study Group and the need for the
US
to “muscle
up” in Baghdad to give the Iraqi Government room to do what was
necessary.
364.
Mr Blair
commented that the problem was how to build the capability of the
Iraqi
Government,
which was essentially “starting from scratch”.
365.
On 29
December, Maj Gen Shirreff wrote to Mr Blair in follow‑up to
his visit
proposing
the establishment of a “Joint Inter‑Agency Task Force” in Basra led
by
the GOC
MND(SE).199
In his view
this would “deliver concentrated British effect” and
“improve
the prospects of strategic success”.
366.
Maj Gen
Shirreff’s diagnosis was that the existing arrangement, with the
PRT
located in
Kuwait, “lacks unity of command and unity of purpose”. The solution
was
“a single
organisation capable of planning, executing and commanding both
security/
military
assistance and reconstruction operations”.
196
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 31‑32.
197
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 29 December 2006, ‘Iraq: Phonecall
with President Bush,
0920 (EST)
29 December’.
198
Letter
Phillipson to Siddiq, 29 December 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s Phonecall
with President Bush,
29
December: Iraq, Isreal/Palestine, Iran’.
199
Letter
Shirreff to Blair, 29 December 2006, [untitled].
68