3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
735.
The MOD
advised Mr Blair on 29 October that its influence on US
planning
was
reducing and the option to deploy UK ground forces was at risk of
being
excluded by
default. The only way to avoid that was to offer Package 3 to
the
US for
planning on the same basis as Package 2.
736.
Package 3
could also significantly reduce the UK’s vulnerability to
US
requests to
provide a substantial and costly contribution to
post‑conflict
operations.
737.
Mr Watkins
wrote to Sir David Manning on 29 October, to report that “US
military
planning
[was] continuing, but increasingly assuming no UK Land
contribution”; and
that an
option for a “significant land contribution” could be “sensibly
kept open only
by placing it
on a similar basis” to Package 2.251
738.
The MOD stated
that Package 3 was:
“… for
practical purposes being excluded by default. If we are to keep the
option
open, and
continue to have the strongest military cards to underpin our
political
influence,
the Defence Secretary believes that we should indicate to the US
that
they should
plan on the assumption that the land contribution would be
available,
subject to
final political approval … It is also worth noting that, while
Package 3
is
significantly more expensive in itself than Package 2, making it
available could
significantly
reduce our vulnerability to US requests to provide a substantial
(and
costly)
contribution to post‑conflict stabilisation
operations.”
739.
The MOD letter
and the advice for Mr Blair from Sir David Manning are
addressed
in Section
6.1.
740.
On 31
October, Mr Blair agreed that the MOD could offer Package 3 to
the
US on
the same basis as Package 2.
741.
The
decision to offer ground forces (Package 3) to the US for
planning
purposes
was a significant step. Once the offer had been made, it would
have
been
difficult to withdraw and constrained the UK’s subsequent policy
choices.
742.
Mr Blair,
Mr Straw, Mr Hoon and Adm Boyce discussed the MOD wish to
offer
Package 3
to the US for planning purposes again on 31
October.252
743.
Mr Rycroft
recorded that Mr Blair concluded that the MOD should tell the
US that
the UK was
“prepared to put Package 3 on the same basis as Package 2 for
planning
purposes,
in order to keep the option open; but that no warning should be
issued to the
Reservists
at this stage”. Mr Blair “should be consulted again before any
such warning
was
issued”.
251
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 29 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Options’.
252
Letter
Wechsberg to Watkins, 31 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Options’.
329