3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
•
Progress
with interviews continued to be “unsatisfactory”, although there
had
been “some
improvement”. Iraq was likely to continue attempts to
monitor
interviews
and to resist interviews outside Iraq.
•
Iraq was
likely to support proposals – for more time for inspections or an
agreed
timetable
or checklist – put forward by those in the UN reluctant to
authorise a
resolution
permitting war.
1073.
Mr Miller
concluded:
“In short,
we have seen no indication that there will be a change in Iraq’s
strategy …
Iraq will
continue to put the onus on the inspectors to set out what they
want rather
than
pro-actively provide information … Saddam will be prepared to offer
further
concessions
– or at least to say he is ready to. But based on current behaviour
any
information
will be incomplete, will be difficult to interpret and will not
represent a
full
declaration of Iraq’s capability. On overseas interviews and any
proposal for
a
substantial UN military force, agreement is likely only in the face
of imminent
military action.”
1074.
In a meeting
with Mr Annan, Mr Straw set out the thinking on revising
the second
1075.
Mr Straw
told Mr Annan that military considerations could not be
allowed
“to dictate
policy”, but the military build-up “could not be maintained for
ever”, and:
“… the more
he had looked into the Iraq dossier the more convinced he had
become
of the need
for action. Reading the clusters document made his hair stand on
end.”
1076.
Mr Straw
set out the UK thinking on a deadline, stating this was “Iraq’s
last
chance”,
but the objective was disarmament and, if Saddam Hussein did what
was
demanded,
“he could stay”. In those circumstances, a “permanent and
toughened
inspections
regime” would be needed, possibly “picking up some earlier ideas
for
an all‑Iraq
NFZ [No-Fly Zone]”.
1077.
Other points
in the discussion included:
•
Mr Kieran
Prendergast, UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs,
pointed
out that
the UK was “reversing the veto: if there were no positive finding,
then
there would
be war”.
•
Mr Ricketts
stated that “it had to be this way round if there were to be
a
clear deadline”.
336
Telegram
366 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Meeting
with
UN
Secretary-General, New York, 6 March’.
371