6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
391.
The lack of
precision in the instructions to departments from No.10
after
the meeting
was indicative of the Government’s persistent failure to define
the
component
parts of the post-conflict task and how different departments
would
be responsible
for addressing them.
392.
In
particular, the relationship between humanitarian relief and
wider
reconstruction,
and between short-, medium- and long-term post-conflict
tasks,
tended to
be overlooked or left unclear.
393.
Throughout
the planning process Mr Blair continued to request, and
receive,
separate
advice on post-conflict issues from Mr Straw, Mr Hoon and
Ms Short.
394.
Mr Blair
convened a meeting on humanitarian issues with Mr Straw,
Mr Hoon,
Ms Short,
Admiral Sir Michael Boyce (CDS) and No.10 officials in the margins
of
Cabinet on
13 February.184
Sir Michael
Jay, Sir Kevin Tebbit and Mr Chakrabarti were
not present.
395.
The IPU
briefing for Mr Straw set out three objectives for the
meeting, including:
“•
encourage Ms
Short to engage fully in planning;
•
persuade Ms
Short that she should allow DFID money to finance small
scale
[reconstruction]
projects in the area administered by a UK commander.”
396.
On the
assumption that discussion might stray beyond humanitarian issues,
the
briefing
included “a background note on other key ‘Day After’ issues”,
including:
“For
how long do we want to run a geographical sector of
Iraq?
“… it seems
very likely that UK forces (under US command) will find
themselves
occupying
an area of south-east Iraq …
…
“In
practical terms, administration of a geographical sector will be
very labour
intensive.
It will be dangerous and difficult …
“There is
likely to be a hybrid model of both geographical sectors under
different
interim
administrations, and lead countries responsible for some issue
nation-wide.
So, for
example, the US want to lead on military issues throughout Iraq.
But the
detail of a
hybrid model remains unclear.”185
184
Letter
Cannon to Bewes, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian
Issues’.
185
Minute Iraq
Planning Unit [junior official] to Private Secretary [FCO], 12
February 2003, ‘Meeting on
Iraq
Day After
Issues Before Cabinet 13 February’.
377