3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
non‑compliance
if they were allowed more time. That would be sufficient to
bring
round
public and international opinion to support military action, even
without
a “smoking
gun”.
864.
A document
entitled ‘Countdown’ appears in the No.10 files for 30 January
2003.282
865.
The Note set
out a potential timetable for action which anticipated two
further
reports
from Dr Blix, on 14 and 28 February and each “harder on
non‑co‑operation”,
leading to
a UN discussion and a resolution “authorising action; or at least
declaring
Iraq in
material breach” by 5 March. Saudi Arabia might then have “10 days
to mobilise
Arab
opinion to try to force Saddam out” before military action
beginning on 15 March.
It would be
“preferable” if the report on 28 February judged that there was “no
sign of
Iraq fully
co‑operating” and that the inspectors could not “disarm unless
there is full
co‑operation”.
The timetable could be:
“…
shortened if either dramatic find by Blix or 14 February report
sufficiently hard;
lengthened,
but not beyond end March, if resolution takes more
time.”
866.
The document
comprised six sections with very short bullet points in
each.
Those were:
•
“Military
Questions”. Whether there were sound plans: in the event that
Saddam
Hussein
used WMD, attacked Israel, or destroyed oil wells; to keep rival
groups
and tribes
apart; and to avoid civilian casualties.
•
“Aftermath
Questions”. What would happen immediately, “a new
Iraqi
government
or US run”? What type of Iraqi government would be the
aim
in the medium
term?
•
“Blix”. Had
been given “very good intelligence”. The Note suggested;
“Close
working”,
“Persuasion of doctrine of non‑co‑operation”; “Tie in with
ElBaradei”;
and “To be
seen by coalition leaders”, including Mr Blair and President
Bush
before 14
February.
•
“Related
Issues”. A renewed push on Afghanistan; progress on the
MEPP;
“HIV/AIDS
and Poverty”; “North Korea”; “US/EU relations”; and
“Oil”.
•
“Diplomacy”.
The approaches to be adopted with a number of UN
Member
States and
the Iraqi Opposition, including courting Russia and China
and
bringing
them fully on board and finding a “way down” for
France.
•
“Strategy”.
The need for: a “Proper communications operation”; joint work
on
planning;
and “regular updates between principals, with clear and set
agenda”.
867.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that Mr Blair had worked on a Note for
President
Bush on the
strategy on the flights to Washington.283
Mr Blair
was extremely concerned
282
Note [Blair
to Bush], [undated], ‘Countdown’.
283
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
159