The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
239.
Mr Blair
said there was a:
“… natural
reluctance to do difficult things, made worse by ignorance … of
Saddam’s
capabilities
and intentions. We had to correct this, at the same time answering
the
legitimate
question of why we were taking action now. 11 September [2001] was
a
powerful
argument for dealing with threats before they materialised … At
some point,
WMD and
terrorism would come together, with appalling consequences, unless
we
took
action.”
240.
A plenary
meeting between President Bush and Mr Blair and their teams
followed
the
restricted discussion.112
241.
Presentational
issues were discussed between officials and in the
plenary,
including
the “Why now?” question.
242.
Mr Blair
stated that since 1998, there was evidence, including in the 6
September
International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report (see previous comment), of
continued
development
of WMD. He also thought that the nature of the Iraqi regime
“should
become part
of our case on WMD”; and that: “We needed an active strategy to
take the
debate to
the rest of the world.” He set out the UK’s plans to publish the
dossier within
a few
weeks.
243.
Mr Campbell
emphasised the need for people “to understand what BW
actually
did”; and
that the “media threshold would be high, so the dossier would need
to include
new facts
from the last four years”.
244.
On 9
September, the JIC issued an Assessment of Iraq’s
possession
of chemical
and biological weapons and possible scenarios for their
use.
245.
The
Assessment contained a number of significant changes
which
strengthened
previous JIC judgements on Iraq’s possession of
chemical
and biological
weapons and the likelihood of their use.
246.
In response to
the request from Sir David Manning for advice on the
possible
scenarios
for Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons, the JIC
commissioned
247.
The Assessment
was discussed in “an informal CIG [Current Intelligence
Group]
of experts”
and then considered by the JIC on 4 September.
112
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 8 September 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with Bush, Camp David
7 September:
Public Presentation of Iraq Policy’.
113
Minutes, 4
September 2002, JIC meeting.
156