6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
319.
Before they
left, Major General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of Joint
Operations
(Operations)
(DCJO(Ops)), provided a paper commenting on US planning, which at
that
stage
offered two basic approaches:
•
a “running
start”, with extra forces being deployed as the initial attacks
were
under way,
which would have the advantage of surprise and allow for
operations
as early as
October 2002; and
•
a
“generated start” allowing full deployment before the beginning of
operations,
which was
expected to require three months longer.
320.
Maj Gen Fry
wrote that the “running start” option carried considerably more
risk
and would
be “much more manoeuvrist” than the type of operations which had
been
conducted
in 1991. A number of issues for the UK were identified, including:
the role and
timing for
a UK contribution; the need for very early decision‑making; how to
integrate
into a
complex US plan; levels of risk; UK participation in US exercises;
and the likely
US
expectations that would result from UK involvement in the planning
process.
321.
On 1 July,
Mr Watkins advised Mr Hoon on Mr Bowen’s visit to
Washington.150
Mr Bowen
had reported that the Americans had a plan, including taking
Baghdad, which
they were
confident would deliver regime change, but there was no clear
direction on
timing.
That would be affected by the decision on whether to choose a
“running start”.
The plan
would be heavily dependent on basing and overflight rights in the
region and
beyond. The
view in Tampa was that it was very early in the planning process
and too
soon to
talk about the UK’s contribution.
322.
Mr Bowen’s
view was that the US military were looking to the UK for a
second
opinion on
their military planning, contributions in kind and influence with
Washington
on the
overall campaign plan. The US military would want “the usual niche
capabilities
(Nimrod,
etc). Whether we provide any more is up to you
[Mr Hoon].”
323.
Similar
conclusions were reported by Maj Gen Wilson to
Lt Gen Reith on
30 June.151
He wrote
that UK influence and counsel was “almost as important,
if
not more so
than what we would actually bring to the campaign militarily”;
although
he
also cautioned that “UK ability to significantly influence
operational design, if so
minded, is
limited”.
324.
Maj Gen Wilson
told the Inquiry: “… what I remember was said … I think
by
General
Abizaid, who was then the Director of Joint Staff in the Pentagon …
‘We need
your
advice. We need your counsel …’”152
150
Minute
Watkins to Secretary of State [MOD], 1 July 2002,
‘Iraq’.
151
Minute
Wilson to Reith, 30 June 2002, ‘Contingency Planning for Iraq –
Report on DCDS(C) Visit to US
27‑29 Jun
02’.
152
Public
hearing, 4 December 2009, page 15.
223