6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
Parliamentary
Labour Party and the House of Commons. He advised of the need
to
“start
working up a Plan B for our Armed Forces if we cannot be sure of
the [House of]
Commons’
approval for their inclusion in the initial invasion of
Iraq”.427
“… it need
not be a disaster for you, the Government, and even more important
for
our troops,
if we cannot take an active part in the initial invasion, provided
we get
on the
front foot with our strategy.
“I am aware
of all the difficulties … But I understand that the US could if
necessary
adjust
their plan rapidly to cope without us. In these circumstances we
could
nevertheless
offer them a major UK contribution to the overall campaign. In
addition
to staunch
political support, this would include … as soon as combat
operations
are over,
full UK participation in the military and civilian tasks, including
taking
responsibility
for a sector and for humanitarian and reconstruction work.
We
could also
take the lead in the UN on securing the … resolution to authorise
the
reconstruction
effort and the UN role in it which the US now agree is
necessary.”
995.
Efforts to
secure Parliamentary approval for military action in Iraq are
addressed
in Section
3.8.
996.
The draft
objectives and guiding principles for post-conflict Iraq
were
resubmitted
to Mr Blair for approval on 12 March.
997.
No decision
was taken and there is no indication that Mr Blair discussed
the
objectives
and principles with Ministers.
998.
In the
absence of a decision from Mr Blair, post-conflict planners
remained
without
clear Ministerial guidance on the nature and extent of the UK’s
post-
conflict
commitment.
999.
On 12 March,
one week before the start of the invasion, Mr Cannon
re-submitted to
Mr Blair
the IPU’s draft objectives for post-conflict Iraq and principles to
guide short‑term
1000.
One item had
been added to the objectives prepared for Mr Blair’s meeting
on
6 March:
that the new Iraqi government should maintain Iraq’s territorial
integrity.
1001.
Mr Cannon
stated that the IPU proposals were “not contentious in UK terms”,
but
“clear
policy approval now would assist our planning for post-conflict
operations”. He
explained
that the objectives had not been drafted for publication: the UK’s
aims would
427
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: What if We Cannot
Win the Second Resolution?’
428
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq: post-conflict
planning: objectives and
principles’.
491