The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
37.
The record of
the video conference did not include any reference to
reconstruction.15
38.
The Annotated
Agenda for the 22 July meeting of the AHMGIR stated that
the
responsibility
for IRRF2 had passed from the US Department of Defense (DoD)
to
the US
State Department.16
The State
Department wanted to review US priorities to
ensure they
were “developmentally sound” and to shift resources from
infrastructure to
governance;
the UK had urged quick decisions to avoid delaying
disbursements.
39.
The Annotated
Agenda advised that a PCO Regional Co-ordinator would
arrive
in Basra at
the end of July and projects would start in September. It appeared
that the
US was
giving priority to programmes “in ‘their’ areas”; there was
therefore a risk of a
reconstruction
gap in the South. The need to speed up US reconstruction in the
South
had been
raised at a recent video conference between Mr Blair and
President Bush.
40.
The Annotated
Agenda set out the action that the UK was taking, in
addition
to lobbying
the US to speed up their efforts, to address the possible
short-term
funding gap:
•
The MOD was
seeking a further £10m from the Treasury for QIPs.
•
DFID was
funding a five-person Project Continuity Team (PCT) based in
the
PCO to help
implement former CPA(South) projects. The PCT had
already
deployed.
•
DFID was
funding a 10-person Technical Advisory Team (TAT)
comprising
infrastructure
and other specialists to help link Iraqi priorities and PCO
plans.
The team
was expected to deploy to Iraq in August.
•
DFID had
developed a £16m programme to generate employment
opportunities
and provide
an emergency response facility to deal with critical failures
in
essential
services in the South over the next six months. The programme
would
start
immediately.
41.
The Annotated
Agenda also stated that the IMF was seeking early agreement on
a
Stand-By
Arrangement for Iraq (a precondition for a Paris Club deal on debt
reduction).
DFID hoped
to deploy advisers to support the Iraqi Government in its
negotiations with
the
IMF.
42.
A UK Trade and
Investment (UKTI) secondee to the PCO told an official at
the
British
Embassy Baghdad on 7 August that he was not aware of any PCO policy
to
withhold
support from Basra in favour of US areas.17
The
official described the secondee
as
“generally very well informed on PCO policies”.
15
Letter
Phillipson to Adams, 22 July 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 22 July: Iraq
and MEPP’.
16 Annotated
Agenda, 22 July 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
17
Email FCO
[junior official] to FCO [junior official], 7 August 2004, ‘PCO
Manning in Basra’.
204