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6.4  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003
86.  During 2001, UK officials began to consider the possible shape of Iraq after
the departure of Saddam Hussein.
87.  At that stage, the UK assumption was that the most likely successor to
Saddam Hussein was another Sunni strongman.
88.  A number of concerns emerged during initial exchanges:
the long-term implications of military action;
US support for the Iraqi opposition;
the dilapidated state of Iraq’s infrastructure;
the risks of de-Ba’athification; and
the absence of obvious successors to Saddam Hussein.
89.  In his memoir, Mr Blair stated that the final part of his speech to the House of
Commons on 18 March 2003, in which he set out the moral case for action against
Saddam Hussein, echoed his Chicago speech of 22 April 1999.66
90.  In the Chicago speech, described in more detail in Section 1.1, Mr Blair had raised
the importance of being prepared for the long term after military intervention.67
91.  In a reference to international security, Mr Blair identified “two dangerous and
ruthless men” as the cause of “many of our problems”: Saddam Hussein and Slobodan
Milošević (President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), both of whom had waged
“vicious campaigns against sections of their own community”. Instead of enjoying its oil
wealth, Iraq had been “reduced to poverty, with political life stultified through fear”.
92.  Mr Blair set out “five major considerations” to guide a decision on when and whether
the international community should intervene militarily in other countries, including:
“… are we prepared for the long term? In the past, we talked too much of exit
strategies. But having made a commitment we cannot simply walk away once the
fight is over; better to stay with moderate numbers of troops than return for repeat
performances with large numbers.”
93.  Mr Blair sent a draft ‘Contract with the Iraqi People’ to President Bush in
December 2001.
94.  In autumn 2000, the Government began a review of the UK’s Iraq policy. That
process, which continued into 2001, is addressed in detail in Section 3.1.
66  Blair T. A Journey. Hutchinson, 2010.
67  Speech, 23 April 1999, Tony Blair, Doctrine of the International Community.
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