9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
561.
Lt Gen
Houghton reported similar concerns expressed by Gen Casey in his
weekly
report on 5
February, but:
“The good
news is that, so long as the conditions are met, he [Casey] is
absolutely
content
with the timeframe for and principle of transition in Maysan and
Muthanna.
We can
brief that to our Ministers with confidence.”270
562.
Dr Reid
presented a paper on transition in Maysan and Muthanna to DOP(I)
on
15
February.271
He
recommended that, as part of a longer-term plan to achieve a
small
residual
MNF presence in MND(SE) by the end of 2006, both provinces should
make the
transition
in May, which would require a firm decision in early March. Delay
would risk a
further
erosion of Iraqi consent.
563.
To assuage US
concerns, the plan had been adapted to include a
residual
UK military
presence (of approximately 120 troops) to provide ongoing support
and
mentoring
to the Iraqi army. Dr Reid’s paper acknowledged, however, that the
MNF had
only
limited control of the 285km border with Iran.
564.
DOP(I) agreed
the approach set out in the paper.272
565.
Mr Blair
made clear that his key concern was that the UK should be able
to
demonstrate
clearly that the conditions for transition had been met and that
this was as
a result of
the increasing capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces. The UK should
not be
handing
over for political reasons.
566.
In the same
meeting Dr Reid, explained that he was concerned to maintain
the
morale of
UK troops in Iraq. While this was, at present, “adequate” and did
not affect
effectiveness,
he believed that the troops felt that they were fighting an
asymmetric
battle in
which the enemy was increasingly bold and their own actions
were
increasingly
constrained.
567.
Mr Blair
told DOP(I) that a delay in the formation of a government was
not
necessarily
disadvantageous, as it presented an opportunity to exploit
underlying splits
in the
UIA.
568.
DOP(I) agreed
to pursue contact with Muqtada al-Sadr.
569.
Mr Straw
visited Baghdad once again from 20 to 21 February, with
objectives
“squarely
on government formation”.273
With all
his interlocutors he pressed the case for
rapid
formation of a government of national unity.274
270
Minute
Houghton to CDS, 5 February 2006, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (197) 5
February 06’.
271
Paper
Secretary of State [MOD], 14 February 2006, ‘Iraq: Handover of
Security in Maysan and
al Muthanna
Provinces’.
272
Minutes, 15
February 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
273
Briefing
FCO, 17 February 2006, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Visit, 20-21
February 2006’.
274
eGram
3684/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 22 February 2006, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Visit,
20‑21 February
2006: Formation of Govern[ment]’.
583