6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
•
Remove the
threat that any Iraqi regime may pose to the UK, UK
interests
and
regional stability through its failure to comply with international
law and
agreements.
That implied:
{{verifiable
destruction of Iraq’s WMD capability; and
{{establishing a
regime that had the trust of the international
community.
•
Reintegrate
Iraq into the international community.
•
Support and
where possible enhance regional stability. That
implied:
{{preventing the
establishment of a Shia dominated Islamic
fundamentalist
state;
and
{{ensuring
the impact of military operations was “at the very minimum
…
neutral in
terms of regional stability”.
•
Prevent the
Iraqi regime from perpetrating further humanitarian
disasters.
•
Enhance the
security of the UK’s long‑term economic interests,
including
oil supplies.
582.
The SPG
defined the UK’s “Military Strategic Objectives” as:
•
provide US
Commanders “with support necessary for the execution of
[the]
approved
campaign plan, focusing first on delivery of critical
capabilities”;
•
assist the
US to create conditions to deny Iraq’s ability to use its
WMD;
•
create
conditions for a changed Iraqi regime;
•
create
conditions to strengthen regional security and stability;
and
•
assist US
forces in securing Iraq’s oil infrastructure and production
facilities.
583.
Other key
points in the paper included:
•
No clear
picture had “yet emerged” on how the US planned to “effect …
regime
change
(other than … military defeat and subsequent elimination of
Saddam
Hussein”.
•
Iraq was
experienced with chemical weapons and had experimented
with
biological
weapons. There was “every reason” to believe they would be
used
if regime
survival was threatened.
•
US and UK
policies on a “deterrent response to Iraqi first use of WMD”
needed
to be
reviewed.
•
There was a
need to determine what would constitute “success for an
inspection
regime”.
•
Package 3
was defined as including “UK Force Elements with a discrete
role
in the
North, within an integrated US‑led campaign”.
•
The risk
analysis was based on the provision of a division
(minus).
•
An
illustrative force package included a Royal Marine Commando Group
which
would be
available after October as part of the maritime element, an
armoured
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