The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
620.
The PRT
withdrew to Kuwait and redeployed to BAS in mid-December,
when
sufficient
hardened accommodation had been constructed.356
621.
Mr Blair
was advised by his Private Secretary later that day that “this move
is likely
to be seen
as a victory by those attacking us”.357
Dr Marsden
and four FCO civilian staff
would
remain in the BPC, while other staff would relocate elsewhere (the
majority to
the BAS).
622.
The US Office
of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
(SIGIR)
published
its audit of PRT capability on 29 October.358
The audit,
which had been
conducted
over the summer, concluded that while the creation of 10 PRTs and
eight
satellite
offices was a “noteworthy achievement”, many obstacles to effective
operation
remained.
Those included insecurity, delays in providing funding, the
difficulty of
recruiting
and retaining qualified civilian personnel, and the difficulty of
integrating
civilian
and military personnel.
623.
On the Basra
PRT, SIGIR assessed that the unstable security situation meant
that
PRT members
had not been able to interact personally with their Iraqi
counterparts,
significantly
limiting the PRT’s ability to achieve its mission. It questioned
“whether the
continued
deployment of PRT personnel to … Basra … makes operational sense
at
this time”.
624.
The Inquiry
has seen no indications that the UK Government discussed
the
SIGIR audit.
625.
The 2 November
weekly update from GOC(MND)SE, which was sent by
Maj Gen Shirreff’s
Chief of Staff, reported that the withdrawal of civilian personnel
had
come as a
surprise to MND(SE).359
It was
expected to have an adverse impact, including
by
disrupting long-term reconstruction because of the “haste with
which the PRT has
been
evacuated”.
626.
On 7 November,
the British Embassy Baghdad and the British Embassy
Office
Basra
responded to an IPU request for accounts of what life was like for
ordinary Iraqi
citizens.
Their replies warned that they could offer only an impressionistic
view due to
the
constraints under which they operated.
627.
The Embassy
reported that:
“Our
protected circumstances constrain our ability to interact with
ordinary Iraqis
or even
visit Baghdad. Our impressions can only be gleaned through the
press,
or piecemeal,
anecdotally and at second or third hand.” 360
356
Report
PCRU/DFID, 19 December 2006, ‘Refocusing Civilian Efforts in Basra
in the Run Up to PIC’.
357
Minute
Banner to Blair, 27 October 2006, ‘Iraq Update, 27
October’.
358
Office of
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 29 October
2006, Status of
the
Provincial
Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq.
359
Report
Everard, 2 November 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – southern Iraq Update – 2
November 2006’.
360
Letter
Gibson to IPU [junior official], 7 November 2006, ‘Life in Baghdad
for Ordinary Iraqis’.
298