9.2  |  23 May 2003 to June 2004

653.  Sir Jeremy went on to say:

“We have a platform for eventual success here.

“That is the point of this telegram. This is a nasty environment. We are

fundamentally unpopular … To come out well, we need one more heavy investment

of effort.

“For a start, there is no military dividend to count on during … 2004. I gathered from

my December contacts with MODUK that this is understood … This theatre remains

a security crisis. Our people need protection.

“… Hard, complex, manpower-intensive decisions are needed from now on. London

cannot afford the luxury of manpower ceilings.”

654.  Sir Jeremy concluded:

“In short, this thing is poised. There is so much at stake that we need to pull the

odds just a bit further our way.”

655.  On 4 January, Mr Blair visited Basra for the day.362 The final item of his itinerary

was a meeting with Ambassador Bremer, Sir Jeremy Greenstock and Sir Hilary Synnott

at Basra Airport.

656.  A briefing note from Mr Blair’s Assistant Private Secretary suggested that he

should cover the following issues:

“• Political process: how to handle Sistani and keep the 15 November timetable on

track?

• Progress on bringing the Sunnis into the political process, including the

implications of Saddam’s arrest.

• Post-1 July security arrangements between Iraq and the international

community.

• Federalism and the Kurdish issue: Bremer’s views?

• Media.”

657.  A record of the meeting said that:

“The Prime Minister was interested in how the political process would develop

through the transition; how and when the UN could best be involved; and what civil

and military US and UK structures we envisaged in place after the June transition.”363

658.  The FCO was asked to provide a note on these points.

362  Minute Cannon to Prime Minister, 2 January 2004, ‘Visit to Basra’.

363  Letter Cannon to Owen, 5 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with Bremer, 4 January 2004’.

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