9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
591.
On the
attitudes of others to the negotiations, the senior official
reported:
“Mohan’s
own attitude to JAM remains ambivalent. He talks of tough steps if
JAM
does not
comply with his demands but he has also been keen to associate
himself
with the
[NAME OF OPERATION] detainee releases. Some around PM Maliki
seem
to fear the
UK might empower or even arm JAM, drawing parallels with US
actions
with Sunnis
in al-Anbar …
“Although
there was considerable US suspicion of the [NAME OF
OPERATION]
process as
a means to UK drawdown, there is strong US interest in the progress
of
the talks
and especially the impact on Iran.”
592.
On 9 November,
Mr McDonald sent a minute to Mr Brown on the renewal of
the
Security
Council resolution describing the MNF mandate in
Iraq.276
He reported
that
Mr Miliband
had decided, on advice from the UK Permanent Mission to the UN in
New
York, that
the UK should propose new language for the US draft making clear
that a
decision on
a resolution for 2009 should be conditions-based. It was expected
that the
US would
reject that language. Mr McDonald continued:
“… we
should not be seen to be leading the demands for a post-2008
resolution,
as this may
send the wrong message about the level of our likely commitment
in
Iraq from
2009 and beyond. I have therefore agreed in Whitehall that if the
US does
indeed
reject our proposal we will accept their position.
“It is a
fact, though, that the absence of a UNSCR will have greater
implications for
the level
and scope of the UK commitment than it will for the US, given our
obligation
to comply
with the European Convention on Human Rights. The US are aware
of
this …
Petraeus recognised that the absence of a UNSCR … would
significantly
constrain
our freedoms and may prejudice the tasks he wants us to perform
…
Nevertheless,
his view was that the strategic context had changed and that,
to
secure the
passage of the next resolution, Maliki would need to present it
internally
as the
last.”
593.
Mr McDonald
recommended that the UK should accept that the next
resolution
would be
the last and should start to look at what would be necessary to
replace it
in 2009,
which was likely to be some form of Status of Forces
Agreement.
594.
In his 11
November weekly report, Lt Gen Rollo reported that a group of mid-
to
senior-level
Sadrists – the Mid Euphrates Awakening – had made contact with
the
MNF-I
engagement cell and there were also signs of Sadrist engagement
with MNF-I in
595.
Lt Gen Rollo
commented that these “and last but not least our – and
the
GOI’s –
engagement with JAM in Basra” illustrated a “remarkable” increase
in MNF-I
276
Minute
McDonald to Prime Minister, 9 November 2007, ‘Iraq: UNSCR
Renewal’.
277
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 11 November 2007, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (276) 11
Nov 07’.
293