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2  |  Decision-making within government
161.  The official also informed Sir David that the MOD was planning on the basis of
a daily press briefing at 1000, and the importance of striking a balance between the
various briefings in theatre, London and Iraq.97
162.  Sir David Manning sent the minute to Mr Jonathan Powell, writing: “Grateful if we
could discuss.”98
163.  An ‘Ad Hoc Meeting’ of Ministers took place daily from 19 March to 12 April, with
the exception of Sundays 30 March and 6 April. The Committee then met five times
before the end of April.
164.  Sir Kevin Tebbit wrote to Sir Andrew Turnbull on 5 March stating:
“I am sure you have this in hand already, but in case it might help, I should like to
offer you my thoughts on the procedure for handling the legal basis for any offensive
operations … in Iraq – a subject touching on my responsibilities since it is the CDS
who will need to be assured that he will be acting on the basis of a lawful instruction
from the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary.
“It is not possible to be certain about the precise circumstances in which this would
arise because we cannot be sure about the UN scenario involved … Clearly full UN
cover is devoutly to be desired – and not just for the military operation itself …
“My purpose in writing, however, is not to argue the legal merits of the case … but to
flag up … that the call to action from President Bush could come at quite short notice
and that we need to be prepared to handle the legalities so we can deliver …
“In these circumstances, I suggest that the Prime Minister should be prepared
to convene a special meeting of the inner ‘war’ Cabinet (Defence and Foreign
Secretaries certainly, Chancellor, DPM [Deputy Prime Minister], Home Secretary
possibly, Attorney General, crucially) at which CDS effectively receives his legal and
constitutional authorisation. We have already given the Attorney General information
and MOD briefings on objectives and rationale, and I understand that John Scarlett
is conducting further briefing on the basis of the intelligence material.
“While it is not possible to predict the timing of the event precisely … could
conceivably be as early as 10 March … in the event, albeit unlikely, that the
Americans lost hope in the UN and move fast. Michael Jay may have a better fix on
this, but I guess the more likely timing would be for Security Council action around
the weekend of 15/16 March, and therefore for a meeting after that.”99
165.  In a minute of 14 March, Mr Powell recorded that “we have agreed” that Mr Blair
would start to hold daily meetings of a ‘War Cabinet” from 0830 on 19 March. Mr Powell
97  Minute Gibbons to Manning, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Crisis Management’.
98  Manuscript note Manning to Powell, 2 February 2003, on Minute Gibbons to Manning, 30 January 2003,
‘Iraq: Crisis Management’.
99  Letter Tebbit to Turnbull, 5 March 2003, [untitled].
293
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