9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
216.
Looking to the
future, Mr Asquith considered that the coalition would need
to
continue to
work with the Iraqi Government to increase Sunni engagement in the
political
process.
The Executive Council was a useful start, but there was also need
to address
immediate
Sunni concerns about security and human rights issues. This would
include
the need to
“address much more systematically sectarianism in the ISF …
establishing
proper data
on abuses and infiltration and ensuring that action is
taken”.
217.
Friction would
be reduced as Basra was handed over to PIC, allowing the UK
to
make a
difference through:
“The high
regard Iraqis have for our advice … We also fulfil for them
something of
the role of
the psychiatrist’s couch, helping them to face their problems. And
they
look on us
as a key influencer of the US.”
218.
Mr Asquith
continued:
“But we
will still need to commit resources. I remain of the small school
that believes
we should
continue to have a reduced military component (beyond some
important
niche
areas), grouped with other coalition allies in a southern base
other than Basra
able to
provide rapidly deployable forces to carry out operations at the
sharp end.
“Outside
the military contribution, our favoured route has been through
providing
expertise.
That will remain necessary, but insufficient.”
219.
On the UK’s
ability to influence the wider effort in Iraq, Mr Asquith
reminded
Mr Miliband
that after the UK had handed back Basra:
“The US
will still be fighting a war … The test of its and others’ action
is how much
they
contribute to that war effort … The degree to which we continue to
contribute
to that war
effort will determine the influence we can bring to bear on US
policy on
Iraq. If it
concludes we are merely hiding behind its effort and military
losses, it will
ignore …
our advice …
“Stepping
away I do not see as an option.”
220.
An update sent
to Ms Aldred by Mr Tim Dowse, the Chief of the
Assessments
Staff, on
16 August said that, overall, the level of violence across Iraq
remained
unchanged.97
It was
judged that Muqtada al-Sadr had effectively lost control of
JAM.
The Assessments
Staff considered that this was a reminder that “whatever the
interests
of the
Sadrists national political leadership, JAM behaviour (including in
Basra) is likely
to be
determined as much if not more by local factors.”
221.
Government
officials working closely with the military met JAM1 again
on
17 August
to follow up a letter he had sent.98
JAM1
complained that he had been
97
Minute
Dowse to Aldred, 16 August 2007, ‘Iraq Intelligence Update – 16
August 2007’.
98
Email
government official working closely with the military, 17 August
2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]:
Meeting
with JAM1 and Next Steps’.
223