The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
343.
There were
also inconsistencies and areas which needed clarification,
including:
•
the
omission of information on imports of bacterial growth
media;
•
declaration
of the development of a variant of the Al Samoud missile which
had
exceeded
the permitted range in test flights; and
•
a lack of
supporting evidence to address unresolved issues identified in the
1999
UNSCOM and
Amorim reports.
344.
In conclusion,
Dr Blix stated that, if Iraq failed to provide evidence
supporting its
statements,
the inspectors could not guarantee that all possibly concealed
items and
activities
would be found; but they would make attempts at concealment more
difficult.
345.
A statement by
the President of the Council said that the members had noted
the
contents of
the briefing and expressed their intention to have a further
discussion “early
in January
after all members of the Council finish their own analytical work”
and more
regular
briefings from UNMOVIC and the IAEA.120
346.
In his remarks
to the Security Council, Sir Jeremy Greenstock drew on
the
statement
issued by Mr Straw on 18 December. He gave examples of weapons
and
materials
which had not been accounted for in the declaration and added
that:
“The
declaration fell well short of providing compelling evidence that
Iraq wishes to
establish a
new co‑operative relationship with UNMOVIC and the Council. On
the
contrary,
it suggested that Iraq had no intention of complying with SCR 1441,
or
taking the
pathway to peace laid down in that resolution. We wanted to see …
the
discrepancies
probed rigorously … In short, we were very disappointed that Iraq
had
not taken
the 1441 opportunity. I would not speculate what this meant. But
Iraq now
had to be
100 percent pro‑active in co‑operating with the inspectors in
accounting
for every
remaining doubt. Withholding this quality of co‑operation risked
bringing
into play
the second part of OP4 of 1441.”121
347.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock also reported that Dr ElBaradei had appealed to
Member
States to
offer whatever information they had to assist UNMOVIC and the IAEA
in
reaching
credible conclusions on Iraq’s weapons programmes.
348.
Sir Jeremy
described the meeting as a “surprisingly low key affair, largely
because
the
non‑permanents had only had the declaration for 36 hours”. Some of
them were
insisting
that they see the un‑excised version.
349.
Sir Jeremy
reported that Dr Blix had told the press that there was little
new
evidence in
the declaration and what was new generally related to
non‑weapons
programmes.
Iraq was co‑operating on process but much more was needed
on
120
UN Press
Release, 19 December 2002, Statement
to Press on Iraq Inspections by Security Council
President
(SC/7614).
121
Telegram
2450 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 20 December 2002, ‘Iraq: WMD
Declaration’.
64