9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
540.
The JIC
assessed the impact of Iraq on the threat from global Islamic
terrorism on
13
April.300
Its Key
Judgements included:
“I. The
conflict in Iraq has exacerbated the threat from international
terrorism and
will
continue to have an impact in the long term. It has confirmed the
belief of
extremists
that Islam is under attack and needs to be defended using force.
It
has
reinforced the determination of terrorists who were already
committed to
attacking
the West and motivated others who were not.
“II. The
Iraq conflict has resulted in an increase in co-operation between
terrorist
networks
…
“III. Some
jihadists who leave Iraq will play leading roles in recruiting and
organising
terrorist
networks … It is inevitable that some will come to the
UK.
…
“V. Iraq is
likely to be an important motivating factor for some time to come
in the
radicalisation
of British Muslims and for those extremists who view
attacks
against the
UK as legitimate.
“VI. An
Iraqi government that includes strong Sunni representation and
speaks
out clearly
against the jihadists would carry considerable credibility in
the
Muslim
world, and the ejection of foreign jihadists by them would be a
powerful
message.”
541.
The JIC judged
that Al Qaida had “capitalised on the Iraq jihad” and had
benefited
in
particular from co-operation between terrorist networks to gain
access to a broader
range of
operatives and support. New relationships across networks were
allowing the
exchange of
expertise and skills.
542.
Lt Gen Kiszely
completed his tour as SBMR-I and sent his “hauldown” report
to
Gen Walker
on 16 April.301
Looking
back at six months in Iraq, he wrote:
“… the
insurgency has been confined to Sunni areas or to Sunni interfaces
with Shia
or Kurd
communities. What little violence has been seen elsewhere – 10 out
of 18
provinces
see only 2 percent of the violence – can be categorised as
terrorism.”
543.
Progress in
MND(SE) had been good, with all four provinces likely to be
under
Provincial
Iraqi Control by March 2006, offering “the potential for
considerable reductions
in UK force
levels”. Set against that was the possibility that other troop
contributors
would
withdraw, creating a need to backfill, and the “yet to be
articulated” US desire for
the UK to
take on MND(CS).
300
JIC
Assessment, 13 April 2005, ‘International Terrorism: Impact of
Iraq’.
301
Minute
Kiszely to CDS, 16 April 2005, ‘SBMR-I’s Hauldown
Report’.
481