9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
98.
Within each
section, the issues of Iraqiisation and governance should
be
“mainstreamed”
and answers provided on:
•
whether
Iraqiisation really was on track and, if not, what could be done;
and
•
how to
build up capacity within the IIG to govern.
99.
Mr Phillipson
noted that although the UK had an enormous stake in getting
these
issues
right, it did not have direct control over the levers. Prime
Minister Allawi therefore
remained
“the key”.
100.
On 29 August
Mr Blair set out his analysis of the issues in a minute to Sir
Nigel,
Mr Jonathan
Powell, his Private Secretary and a junior member of his No.10
staff.47
He wrote:
“The
situation is self-evidently serious. But two basic elements remain
valid:
“We are
trying to help Iraq become what most Iraqis want it to be; and the
FRE
and extremists
are trying to stop us …
“Iraq has
therefore become the battleground for the future of the region:
does it
go benign,
showing Muslim and Arab nations can embrace the modern world;
or
descend
into a mixture of religious fanaticism and brutality that only
brutal dictators
or even
less than brutal dictators can manage? …
“Our
strategy is fine in one sense: Iraqiisation of security and support
for the
democratic
political process. The problem is that the urgency of the situation
may
overwhelm
us and make our timelines for Iraqiisation naïve.
“The fact
is Allawi needs help now; and there has to be a clear sense of our
gripping
the
situation now.”
101.
Mr Blair
listed things that should be done, including:
•
providing
“first-class political, media and strategic capability … now” to
support
Prime
Minister Allawi, drawing on “the best home-grown Iraqi talent”
supported
by “our
own people” who should be “hand-picked” immediately;
•
examining
DFID’s assistance to key Iraqi ministries, in particular defence,
“to
ensure real
robustness and … if necessary, our people put in”;
•
ensuring
Prime Minister Allawi had immediate access to “strong,
well-armed
brigades
who can move into any trouble-spot and clean up”, with
“commanders
in the
field whose loyalty and that of their troops is
clear”;
•
unblocking
funding for reconstruction, which was “key to winning hearts
and
minds”;
47
Minute
Prime Minister to Sheinwald, 29 August 2004, ‘Iraq’.
411