9.6  |  27 June 2007 to April 2008

145.  Pressed by Mr McDonald on the size of the UK’s training contribution, ACM Stirrup

characterised it as “whatever is necessary to carry out whatever tasks are decided”.

But those troops would need to rely on US life support as there would be no UK force

protection.

146.  ACM Stirrup had suggested that Mr Brown should tell President Bush that the UK

was “prepared to provide some hundreds, provided the tasks are there”. Mr McDonald

observed that ACM Stirrup “was clearly reluctant to provide over 500”.

147.  Mr Brown discussed Iraq with President Bush at Camp David on 30 July.66 The

meeting note drafted by Mr Brown’s Private Secretary recorded only that Mr Brown

welcomed the common ground between himself and President Bush on Iraq and had

outlined the UK’s proposals for a “development agency” in Basra.

148.  During the visit, Mr Brown and President Bush also met privately over dinner and

breakfast. Over dinner they “discussed the progress in the provinces overseen by the

UK now moving to overwatch” but the content of the discussion was not recorded.

149.  Mr McDonald provided Mr Brown with a substantial ‘Steering Brief’ on Iraq for the

Camp David meeting.67 In it he wrote that, on the Iraqi political process:

“Bush is habitually optimistic about the prospects. But in reality, the picture is

bleak. The political process is not delivering even gradual progress, as we hoped

it would …”

150.  Mr McDonald wrote that the US surge had delivered mixed results, and that doubts

over ISF capability raised concerns about the sustainability of the gains which had

been made. In Basra, it was important that PIC should happen before November, when

the next roulement of troops would take place, but Gen Petraeus was believed to be

sceptical about the ability of the local ISF to handle the city’s security.

151.  In a press conference after the meeting on 30 July, President Bush told reporters

that:

“There is no doubt in my mind that Gordon Brown understands that failure in Iraq

would be a disaster for the security of our own countries, that failure in Iraq would

embolden extremist movements throughout the Middle East, that failure in Iraq

would basically say to you know people sitting on the fence around the region that al

Qaeda is powerful enough to drive great countries like Great Britain and America out

of Iraq before the mission is done.”68

152.  Mr Brown re-emphasised the UK’s obligations to the Iraqi people and the United

Nations and his hope that the UK would shortly be able to transfer security responsibility

66  Letter Clunes to Gould, 31 July 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with President Bush: Iraq […]’.

67  Minute McDonald, [undated], ‘Iraq: Steering Brief’.

68  Camp David Press Conference, 30 July 2007.

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