The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
339.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements were:
“•
Only
massive military force would be guaranteed to topple Saddam. The
regime
expects a
US attack […].
•
The clear
prospect of a major attack would put the regime under
unprecedented
pressure.
But regime cohesion is unlikely to collapse in the absence of a
large
scale
invasion.
•
Saddam
relies on a mixture of patronage and extreme fear to retain power
and
contain
opposition. Real loyalty and support for his regime is confined to
the top
of the
hierarchy.
•
The Special
Republican Guard (SRG) and the Republican Guard Forces
Command
(RGFC) are more reliable than the Regular Army (RA). All
would
initially
fight a US‑led attack. Once the regime was perceived as doomed
the
military’s
will to fight on would be sorely tested.
•
Regime
disintegration would be most likely if Iraqi ground forces were
being
comprehensively
defeated; if top military officers could be persuaded that
their
fate was
not irrevocably tied to that of Saddam; or if Saddam himself were
to
be killed.
Military units are more likely to suffer mass desertions than
revolt as
340.
The Assessment
also stated:
“Saddam and
his regime have proved durable …
“The Iraqi
military are aware of their vulnerability to air power, probably
their greatest
weakness;
their main way of mitigating this is through dispersal, including
into
urban areas
[…] We have only fragmentary intelligence indicating how the
regime
might deal
with an all‑out attack including ground forces. But we
assess that only
massive
military force could be guaranteed to topple Saddam.”
341.
Addressing the
policy implications of the Assessment, the JIC stated:
“Saddam
and his
regime must be convinced that any move to topple him is serious and
likely to
succeed
before they begin to feel the pressure.”
342.
In early
July, Mr Hoon proposed a collective Ministerial discussion,
which
Mr Straw
supported.
343.
On 2 July,
Mr Watkins reported to Sir David Manning that “US military
thinking is
quite well
advanced”, but US planners were assuming offensive operations to
overthrow
Saddam
Hussein “in a policy void”.162
The US
“end‑state to be achieved after conflict”
161
JIC
Assessment, 4 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion’.
162
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 2 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
226