The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

be “Iraqi leadership and presentation”, improvements in services and dealing with

corruption in the IPS.

162.  On 14 September, the UN Security Council met to hear quarterly reports on

Iraq.109 Mr Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, UN Special Representative for Iraq, commended

Prime Minister Maliki’s initiative in relation to the National Reconciliation Plan, which

merited “the widest possible support” from the international community.

163.  In Mr Qazi’s view, Iraq was at an important crossroads “and the challenges facing

the people had never appeared more daunting”. If current discord prevailed there was

a danger of the breakdown of the Iraqi state and, potentially, civil war. It was crucial that

the international community provided Iraq with the assistance it needed.

164.  Ambassador John Bolton, US Permanent Representative to the UN, told the

Security Council there had been “significant successes in the development of legitimate

political, economic and governmental institutions in Iraq” but “the sustained level of

ethno‑sectarian violence was one of the most significant threats to security and stability

in Iraq”. He said that Iraq’s neighbours shared some responsibility for this:

“Syria should prevent financial and material support, particularly arms, from entering

Iraq. Iran should stop providing munitions and other support to extremist groups …”

165.  At Mr Blair’s request, when DOP met on 14 September discussion focused on

Basra and Op SALAMANCA.110

166.  ACM Stirrup said that Op SALAMANCA was a good plan. Its objectives were

increasing Iraqi political grip on the issue, by having a visible Iraqi face on the plan, and

increasing the confidence and competence of the ISF. Follow‑on development work

would need to take place rapidly, and other government departments would need to help

drive delivery.

167.  Mr Browne observed that the success of the operation was not entirely within the

UK’s control. In determining how UK forces were to confront JAM, it would be important

to avoid Prime Minister Maliki feeling obliged to condemn UK actions against the Shia.

It would also be vital to separate the extreme and moderate elements of the Badr corps

and the Sadrists. Encouraging Prime Minister Maliki to do a deal with Muqtada al‑Sadr

would be helpful.

168.  Mrs Beckett commented that, despite being in the majority and in government,

the Shia still felt as if they were in Opposition. Although she shared Mr Browne’s high

hopes for Op SALAMANCA, she observed that the Baghdad Security Plan had led to

an increase in attacks and casualties. She highlighted the increasing vulnerability of

the UK’s civilian staff in Basra, whose efforts were being increasingly hampered by the

security situation.

109  UN Security Council ‘5523rd meeting 14 September 2006’ (SC/8829).

110  Minutes, 15 September 2006, DOP meeting.

34