4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
473.
Mr Powell
concluded:
“The threat
argument will be a major problem in the press/parliamentary assault
after
the dossier
comes out and we need to flag up the point in the preface at
publication
and during
the debate We need to set the test for ourselves at a level we can
meet”.
474.
Later on 18
September, Mr Campbell sent Mr Scarlett the impressions
of a
member of
his team whom he had asked to read the draft.235
Mr Campbell
wrote that
“Overall,
she found it convincing”, “CW/BW in particular”. She had, however,
found
the nuclear
section confused and unconvincing, and it had left her thinking
that there
was
“nothing much to worry about”. The section “lacked the clarity of
the rest of the
document”.
“Sorry to
bombard on this point, but I do worry that the nuclear section will
become
the main
focus and as currently drafted is not in great shape.”
476.
Mr Scarlett
informed Mr Campbell that he had seen the comments and was
taking
account of
them in the revision of the dossier.236
477.
Commenting on
the Executive Summary, Mr Ed Owen, Mr Straw’s Special
Adviser,
wrote that
it did not read “well enough to give a sceptical reader the
confidence to
believe
that the dossier provides the necessary
information”.237
478.
Mr Scarlett
informed the JIC on 18 September of the latest position on the
draft
dossier,
and that “a final version would have to be agreed and with the
printers by the
end of the
following day”.238
479.
The
co-ordination arrangements for producing the draft and deciding on
its
handling
had “gone well”. Mr Scarlett also “said he wanted to thank all
those from
the intelligence
community who had played a part in the document’s production.
Their
helpful,
balanced, co-operative and collaborative approach had been much
appreciated.”
480.
There is no
record of any substantive points being raised.
481.
Sir Stephen
Lander, Director General of the Security Service, Sir Francis
Richards,
Sir Richard
Dearlove, Mr Webb, Mr Cragg, and Sir David Omand were
amongst those
present.
Sir David Manning, AM French and Mr Bowen were not
present.
235
Email
Hatfield to Scarlett, 18 September 2002, ‘Another dossier
memo’.
236
Email
Scarlett to Campbell, 18 September 2002, ‘Another dossier
memo’.
237
Email Owen
to Scarlett and others, 17 September 2002, ‘Re Iraq –
Dossier’.
238
Minutes, 18
September 2002, JIC meeting.
203