12.2 |
Conclusions: Security Sector Reform
135.
Basra
transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control on 16 December 2007. Maj
Gen Binns
told the
Inquiry that the ISF “were well trained, as individuals, but their
leadership was
not
experienced, they were capable of conducting tactical, low‑level
operations, but
their
ability to conduct manoeuvre, to sustain themselves logistically,
was a challenge to
them”.76
The police
were “a mixed bag”.
136.
Reports on the
ISF’s capability did not change materially in the period
leading
up to the
UK’s withdrawal. There remained concern over their ability and
willingness
to maintain
security in the South. When Mr Brown and Mr Browne had
breakfast with
the Chiefs
of Staff on 6 March 2008, the Chiefs told them that “there was
quality in the
ISF but it
was not broadening as rapidly as hoped, so training and mentoring
of 14Div
137.
On 2 April, a
junior official in PJHQ wrote to Mr Browne, advising him
that
MND(SE) was
intending to embed MiTTs within 14th Division to strengthen some of
the
key
vulnerabilities that had been demonstrated during the recent
operation, Operation
Charge of
the Knights. That decision is addressed in the Box below. The
operation and
its impact
are described in Section 9.8.
The concept
of military transition teams (MiTTs), in which US military
personnel were
embedded
within Iraqi fighting units, was first put forward by the US in
early 2005. It was
seen as a
successful tactic, and had been used by the UK in
Afghanistan.
Although
the UK deployed MiTTs to work with 10th Division during the summer
of 2007,
it did not
adopt the same approach for 14th Division until April 2008,
choosing instead to
focus on
leadership and embedding UK personnel at brigade and divisional
level.
The
different approaches taken by the UK and the US between 2005 and
2007 again
demonstrated
the lack of coherence across the SSR effort. It also created
tensions with
the US who
believed that the UK had not adopted the same approach because of
an
aversion to
casualties.
138.
By mid‑April,
confidence in the IPS was so low that Major General
Barney
White‑Spunner,
GOC MND(SE) from February 2008 to May 2008, warned that
there
were
discussions in Multi‑National Corps‑Iraq (MNC‑I) and the Iraqi
Government over
whether to
disband the Basra police entirely and start again.
139.
On 14 May, the
JIC stated that public confidence in the ISF had grown but
the
same
concerns remained about how it would fare against Jaysh al‑Mahdi
(JAM)
resistance.
76
Public
hearing, 15 January 2010, page 25‑26.
77
Letter
Fletcher to Rimmer, 6 March 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s Breakfast with
Chiefs of Staff, 6 March’.
439