The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1271.
CC Kernaghan
was accompanied on the visit by the Police and Justice
Team
Leader from
the FCO’s Conflict Issues Group, who reported:
“The IPS is
widely recognised as an integral part of the security problem,
exhibiting
a serious
propensity to undermine, rather than enforce, law and order. It
barely
functions
in Basra, suffering from a paralysing combination of deeply
embedded
corruption
(including involvement in extra‑judicial killings), militia
infiltration, poor
leadership
(the recently confirmed Chief of Police, Al Hamadi, appears to
inspire
little loyalty),
and weak command and control structures. The dearth of local
IPS
officers
willing to staff the nascent Internal Affairs Department
illustrates the depth
of the
problem; recruits have finally been found, following MOI
intervention, in a
nearby
province.
“The early
stages of SINBAD have confirmed the extremely poor state of the
IPS.
From an
over‑complex and over‑staffed organisational structure lacking
basic
administrative
capacity, to the decaying police stations with no mains electricity
and
inadequate
sewerage, the conditions on the ground are grim.”1183
1272.
The Police and
Justice Team Leader recommended to Mr Pattison and
Ms Joan
Link, Head
of the Conflict Issues Group, that the UK should:
“•
Extend the
window of opportunity offered by Operation SINBAD by
re‑deploying
a number of
UK police officers more directly in support of efforts to tackle
gross
IPS
corruption, the key obstacle to longer‑term improvement of the
IPS;
•
Increase UK
strategic policing input at the MOI in Baghdad, to support
the
development
of national, and by extension provincial, capacity
(including
increased
financial and logistical expertise) and thereby improve the
chances
of sustainability;
•
Encourage
greater Rule of Law co‑ordination between ministries in
Baghdad
and between
the capital and provinces, again to improve sustainability.
Leverage
EU
financing and expert support as far as possible.”
1273.
The British
Embassy Baghdad produced a ‘Police Forward Look’ in
November
2006 which
assessed priorities in Basra (described in Box, ‘Enabling the
police to tackle
crime’,
earlier in this Section).1184
It
stated:
“Key target
– getting to PIC. Assumption: policing work will be more difficult
in Basra
city
post‑PIC. Will not be possible to fully tackle police corruption
pre‑PIC. Police to
concentrate
on required level – not set sights higher.”
1183
Report, 17
October 2007 [sic], ‘UK’s Policing Contribution in Iraq: Visit to
Basra, 4‑7 October’.
1184
Paper BE
Baghdad, November 2006, ‘Police Forward Look’.
350