The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
655.
In
Gen Jackson’s view, Lord Drayson:
“… was
able, using his ministerial authority, and to be fair his
commercial
experience,
to cut through some of the Gordian knots which seemed to
surround
what
otherwise was this complex process.”
656.
The Inquiry
asked Gen Dannatt about Sir Peter Spencer’s comment that
if the
Commanders
in Chief had concerns about UORs they would have been raised,
and
asked
whether he was satisfied that the Army had had the equipment it
needed to fight
in Iraq
coming through the UOR process.345
Gen Dannatt
replied:
“In general
terms the answer is yes. There was a problem, though, which was
…
that the
process whereby the troops deployed on the front line saw a
requirement
and
reported it back to PJHQ, the action in the PJHQ and the staff
there, which
were
relatively small in number, were able to turn the opinion and the
requirement
of soldiers
on the ground into a rapidly staffed requirement for new and
changed
equipment
that could then be fired at the Defence Procurement Agency or
whatever
it was at
the time.
“I felt
that there was a greater role that … Land Command, could have
played to
help out at
least the horse power of those on the equipment staff of PJHQ, and
also
play our
wider understanding of army requirements from our frequent
involvements
informally
with the troops on the front line. I thought we could actually get
a greater
understanding,
get it more quickly. I made several offers, and they were taken
up
eventually,
to have my own equipment staff help the PJHQ equipment staff to try
to
convert the
needs of the front line into identified requirements that the
procurement
system
could then get on and act upon.”
657.
Gen Dannatt
added that he “was never convinced” that “we were actually
doing
all we
could be doing to make sure that we had the right equipment, in the
right quantity
in … front
line hands, as quickly as possible”; and that “there was a bit of
deficiency in
leadership
and energy at times”.
658.
When asked
specifically about why it had taken so long to find a
replacement
vehicle for
Snatch, Gen Dannatt told the Inquiry:
“All
commanders have accepted there is the need to have a light patrol
vehicle.
Narrow
streets, small roadways and so on, that you have got a vehicle that
can get
down these
places.
“That has
been used as a justification to keep the existing Snatch in small
numbers
still in
theatre for the present moment.
“Another
line is … and I was strongly of this view, let’s get all the Snatch
out as
quickly as
we can, but if you accept there is a need for a light patrol
vehicle, it was
345
Public
hearing, 28 July 2010, pages 43‑45.
112