3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
crises
against Iraq. At the same time, this would reassure Iraq with
regard to its
security,
sovereignty, territorial integrity and its right to choose its own
way without
interference,
in accordance with … the [UN] Charter …”
89.
Intensive
discussions about the approach to be adopted
continued.
90.
Some
elements of the US proposals continued to present
difficulties.
91.
Sir David
Manning explicitly warned Dr Rice that the UK was not in
the
business of
manufacturing a casus belli.
92.
Intensive
discussions between the US and UK continued over the next
three
days. As
well as discussions between officials in New York and Washington,
there were
frequent
telephone calls between No.10 and the White House.
93.
Mr Straw
also spoke to Secretary Powell.23
94.
Mr Straw
spoke to Mr Dominique de Villepin.24
95.
Mr Matthew
Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
spoke
96.
In addition to
the points set out in the preceding paragraphs, other issues
which
emerged
during the discussions were:
•
Re‑writing
or going beyond resolution 1284 (1999) would open up
“Pandora’s
box”.
•
Whether to
seek to interview Iraqi citizens outside Iraq.
•
Saddam
Hussein could not impose conditions on UNMOVIC
operations.
•
Disarmament
would occur either through inspection or military
action.
•
There was a
good chance that Iraq would now make mistakes.
•
Avoiding
Saddam Hussein spinning out the process so that military
action
could not
be launched and completed before summer 2003.
•
The
importance of demonstrating a firm position and unity in
the
Security Council.
23
Telegram
482 FCO London to Washington, 18 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conversation
with US
Secretary of State, 18 September’.
24
Telegram
198 FCO London to Paris, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conversation with
French
Foreign Minister, 20 September 2002’.
25
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 18 September 2002, ‘Iraq: French
Views’.
215